Japan and Asian-Pacific security: regionalization, entrenched bilateralism and incipient multilateralism

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Abstract This paper traces the formal and informal aspects of Japan’s robust bilateralism on issues of external and internal security and discusses a variety of embryonic multilateral arrangements that have sprung up in the 1990s. Asian-Pacific multilateralism is not yet a strong and unquestioned collectively held norm in either Tokyo or any of the major capitals in the Asia-Pacific. What matters instead are political practices shaped by a strong tradition of bilateralism and, only very recently, by an incipient multilateralism.

Keywords National security; internal security; bilateralism; multilateralism.

1. Introduction

Regionalization is becoming an increasingly important aspect of Japan’s and the Asia-Pacific’s security affairs. We support this claim by showing the existence of a variety of formal and informal, bilateral arrangements in Japan’s security policy that in turn help generate different forms of incipient multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific. The paper concludes that Asian-Pacific multilateralism is traditional, in contrast to the ‘new’ types more readily apparent in Europe and subject of critical security studies.
The precise meanings of the terms region and security are, however, far from clear. Regions are combinations of physical, psychological and behavioral traits (Mansfield and Milner 1997: 3–4; Lake and Morgan 1997: 11–12; Fawcett 1995: 10–11; Morgan 1997: 20; Daase 1993: 77–9; Thompson 1973; Cantori and Spiegel 1970; Russett 1967). While geographical proximity is important, regions cannot be reduced to spatial dimensions. Jeffrey Frankel (1997: 37, 118, 124–5), for example, has demonstrated the powerful effects that political borders have. But he also finds that ‘the effect of sharing a common language, even for far-removed countries, is very similar in magnitude to the effect of sharing a common border’ (Frankel 1997: 75). Regions are thus not only geographically given but also politically made.

A world of regions is shaped by economic and social processes of regionalization and by structures of regionalism (Grugel and Hout 1999; Fishlow and Haggard 1992; Fawcett and Hurrell 1995). Regionalization describes geographic manifestations of political, military, economic or social processes at the international level. As we argue in this paper, regionalization can be both societal and governmental. We argue below that it occurs in the area of social phenomena, such as crime, and in the area of national security policies that governments adopt.

The concept of ‘comprehensive’ security was initially championed by Japan in the late 1970s (Alagappa 1998; Inoguchi forthcoming). It was developed further by ASEAN in the 1980s. When in the 1990s China made increasing use of the concept, it gained even wider currency throughout the Asia-Pacific. Throughout most of the Asia-Pacific region, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 has reinforced further the belief that security must be understood in ‘comprehensive’ terms that goes beyond traditional military connotations.

In the case of Japan the concept of comprehensive security includes both external (‘international’) and internal dimensions. Both are bringing Japan’s Defense Agency (JDA), the Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) which is a part of the Ministry of Transportation, and the National Police Agency (NPA) closer together. By exchanging information and developing new forms of cooperation the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF), and the police are attempting to meet what to the government looks like novel threats to Japan’s national security including incursions into Japan’s coastal waters, acts of terrorism and guerilla attacks on airports, nuclear power plants and harbors (Japan Times, June 17, 1999; Interview 10–00, Tokyo, January 14, 2000).

This paper traces the formal and informal aspects of Japan’s robust bilateralism on issues of external (section 2) and internal (section 3) security, and discusses a variety of embryonic multilateral arrangements that have sprung up in the 1990s (section 4). The Conclusion argues briefly that Asian-Pacific multilateralism differs in kind from the multilateralism that has become the object of attention of students of globalization.
2. Formal bilateralism and changes in the US–Japan security arrangements

The political consolidation of the formal US–Japan security arrangements since the mid-1990s has regionalized their scope in the Asia-Pacific’s evolving security orders. In the early years of the Clinton administration growing bilateral trade conflicts, Japanese uncertainty about US strategy in the Asia-Pacific, and a growing emphasis on the Asia-Pacific in Japanese policy pointed to the possibility of a loosening of bilateral ties. But the actual parameters of change in Japan’s security policy were outlined in the August 1994 Higuchi report to the prime minister. Even more important, they were shaped by the February 1995 Nye Report.¹ Subsequently, Japan’s first revision of the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) since its adoption in 1976 (November 1995) culminated in the Japan–US Joint Declaration on Security of April 1996 and a review of the 1978 Guidelines for US–Japan Defense Cooperation in September 1997. This review spells out concretely the roles of the US military and the GSDF in the eventuality of a crisis. Based on the review, a new Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) was signed by the two governments in April 1998 (Asahi Shimbun, April 28, 1998, evening 4th edition).² The new agreement referred specifically to ‘situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security’ as the context in which the two governments could provide supplies and services to each other (Gaiko Forum 1999: 139).³

The negotiation of the guidelines was deadlocked until low-level staff from the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) interviewed US military personnel about the practical planning issues that, from the perspective of the US, needed to be addressed. The list those interviews generated was eventually passed on to the higher echelons inside the JDA. Negotiations that eventually resulted in forty specific measures were affected by the 1994 crisis over North Korea’s nuclear program. That crisis convinced the Japanese government of the need for a legal framework that covers emergency situations not involving direct attacks on Japan (Interview 02–99, Tokyo, January 11, 1999; Ina 1997: 30; Asahi Shimbun, May 21, 1998, 13th edition; February 10, 1999, 14th edition; April 27, 1999, 14th edition).⁴

Political implementation of the revised guidelines in the form of Japanese legislation proved to be controversial. The original bill was approved by the cabinet in April 1998, but leaders of the LDP and the government admitted that, because it was so controversial, the bill would not be able to pass during that year’s Diet session (Jo 1998a; Asahi Shimbun, April 26 and May 3, 1998, 14th editions). Eventually, several changes were made to the bill to assure its passage, among them the dropping of controversial clauses on ship inspections.⁵ The defense guideline bills eventually passed the Lower House in April 1999 and the Upper House one month later.
The new guidelines pose formidable challenges for a redefinition of the mission and operations of Japan’s military, specifically of the MSDF. Military and bureaucratic experts now pay great attention to having their voices heard as the government attempts to clarify the operational implications of the new guidelines (Interview 10–00, Tokyo, January 14, 2000). In the context of modern warfare the new defense cooperation arrangements have diluted somewhat the traditional post-war policy of prohibiting any use of force in the absence of a direct attack on Japan. They have done so in part because of the extension in the scope of the US–Japan security arrangements. For one simple reason regionalization is likely to complicate matters in a future crisis. For the GSDF it is easier to draw a line in the sand than it would be for the MSDF to draw a line in the water (Interviews 12–99 and 13–99, Tokyo, January 14, 1999).

The Japan–US Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security has always performed an important regional function owing to (1) ‘an implicit contribution to regional security through Article 5 of the Treaty (the defence of Japan)’ (Green and Self 1996: 42) and (2) the placing of US bases in Japan under Article 6 (the maintenance of international peace and stability in the Far East) (Watanabe and Ina 1998: 20). But the growing importance of regional considerations has linked the regional scope of the treaty with authorization of SDF operations in crisis situations that do not involve any direct attack on Japan. In its effects the security arrangement between the two countries has been more thoroughly regionalized than before. SDF operations will no longer focus solely on the defense of the Japanese home islands (Interview 03–99, Tokyo, January 12, 1999). A key provision of the revised NDPO underlines this regional dimension:

Should a situation arise in the areas surrounding Japan which will have an important influence on national peace and security, [Japan will] take appropriate response in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws and regulations, for example, by properly supporting the United Nations activities when needed, and by ensuring the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan–US security arrangements.

(Bocicho, n.d.: 38)

Put differently, the scope of the NDPO and the Defense Cooperation Guidelines has broadened, in the eyes of the proponents of such development, from having the SDF defend Japan against direct attack, and thus securing Japan’s position in a global anti-Communist alliance, to having the SDF enhance through various measures stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and thus Japan’s own security. In the 1997 Defense Cooperation Guidelines a new type of ‘mutual cooperation planning’ complements traditional ‘bilateral defense planning’ (Igarashi and Watanabe 1997: 35).

The Security Treaty itself has been left untouched. Attention has been
drawn inside Japan to a provision in the new guidelines stating that the ‘rights and obligations’ under the treaty remain unchanged. And according to the Japanese government, which sees a revising of the treaty as too controversial to be politically feasible, the implementing of measures included in the new guidelines is not required by the treaty. Thus, in the context of Japanese domestic politics, an extension in the scope of the security arrangements between the two countries is sharply differentiated from any broadening of the scope of the treaty itself.

The redefinition in the scope of future US–Japan defense cooperation raises concerns in many quarters: among those, mostly in Japan, fearing the risk that Japan might be dragged into global conflicts; among those, mostly in the US, doubting Japan’s commitment to a more equal partnership in securing, through collective defense measures, regional peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific; and among those, in the Asia-Pacific, worrying about the possible application of the revised guidelines to the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan.

The fear of a globalization of Japan’s defense cooperation with the US had existed throughout the Cold War, especially among members of the Japanese Left. It was therefore no surprise that in the Diet, Social Democratic and Communist Parties opposed the cabinet bill implementing the new guidelines. With roughly a third of its Diet members former Socialists, the largest opposition party, the Democratic Party, also voted against the bill (Asahi Shimbun, April 21, 28, and May 25, 1999, 14th editions). The fear of getting entangled in international military conflicts remains widespread in Japan.

With such a fear in view, the new guidelines attempt in various ways to reassure a skeptical audience in Japan. According to the guidelines, ‘[w]hen the two governments reach a common assessment of the state of each situation, they will effectively coordinate their activities’ (V); and the two governments’ taking of appropriate measures in response to crises will be ‘based on their respective decisions’ (V-2). The revised guidelines also say that ‘Japan will conduct all its actions within the limitations of its Constitution and in accordance with such basic positions as the maintenance of its exclusively defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles’ (II-2); and they limit contingencies in which the SDF will provide rear area support to the US forces, to ‘situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security’ (V). Furthermore, the 1999 law implementing the guidelines offers, as a typical example of such ‘situations’, ‘situation that, if allowed to stand as it is, is in danger of developing into a direct armed attack on Japan’. Thus the new guidelines, in face of strong opposition, have been presented to the public as both securing independent decision-making by Japan, and sustaining post-war Japan’s low-profile security policy.

The fear in the US defense establishment runs in the opposite direction. In the mid-1990s there was a pervasive sense that the alliance was eroding
from within. Japan’s growing interest in regional multilateral arrangements and its renewed attention to the United Nations were seen as a hedging strategy against a possible weakening of the US presence in East Asia (Cronin and Green 1994: 2). Since 1995/96 such sentiments, though weaker, persist. Whether it is justified or not, the perception of Japan’s ‘tepid’ and ‘cautious’ response to many US requests for closer defense cooperation in the past, makes ambiguity in the scope of future defense cooperation worrisome. When the chips are down, ask members of the US defense establishment, can US policy really count on the active support of the Japanese SDF?

The volatile issue of Okinawa is a case in point (Mochizuki 1997: 24–8; Cossa 1997: 43–7; Shimada 1997; Yamaguchi 1997; Johnson 1997; Institute of Social Science 1998). In a bloody battle in the waning months of the Pacific War, a quarter (by one estimate), of the citizens of Okinawa were killed. Ever since, US policy has been one of occupation rather than reform. Many Okinawans regard themselves as different from and having been treated in less than an equitable way by the rest of Japan, a sentiment increasingly recognized by non-Okinawan Japanese. The issue of American bases has brought these powerful emotions into the open in the 1990s. The smoldering conflict erupted when three US servicemen raped a 12-year-old Okinawan schoolgirl on September 4, 1995. Okinawa was the prefecture in Japan which had the lowest per capita income in 1997. It was saddled with the costs of hosting more than half of the US military presence in Japan. American bases occupy about 20 per cent of the main island. In terms of land area about 75 per cent of all US military facilities in Japan are situated in Okinawa, about a third of which are located on private property (Asahi Shimbun, February 16, 2000, 14th edition; Johnson 1997: 5). A staging area for the US military in the Asia-Pacific, Okinawa suffers from a variety of social ills and economic opportunities foregone.

Under the leadership of a popular governor, Masahide Ota, about 53 per cent of the total Okinawan electorate voted in the first-ever prefectural plebiscite held in Japan on September 8, 1996, for both consolidation and reduction of the US military presence and a reform of the US–Japan Status of Forces Agreement. At present the situation is at a stalemate, between the US and Japan as well as between the central government and the citizens of Nago who on December 21, 1997, voted by a slight majority, despite heavy political pressure, against the relocation of the Futemna Marine Corps Air Station to their community. The Japanese central government is trying to buy the assent of the 55,000 citizens of Nago, with approximately 1 billion dollars in subsidies to be invested during the coming decade. For the time being the operational side of US–Japan security relations exists on a politically fragile basis of support (Interviews 01–99 and 03–99, Tokyo, January 11–12, 1999; French 2000).

The application of the revised guidelines to potential instabilities on the Korean Peninsula is also a source of political controversy (Hughes 1996).
In March 1999 Japanese destroyers fired warning shots at intruding North Korean vessels. This was the first time since its creation in 1954 that the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) engaged in such operations. Ignoring several warnings by the destroyers as well as gunfire from the Japanese coastguard (MSA) patrol boats, the North Korean vessels were apparently permitted to escape after they went beyond Japan’s air defense identification zone (Kristof 1999a; Defense Agency 2000: 210). North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs as well as its faltering economy have raised the specter of another Korean War that could enmesh Japan and affect it directly if weapons of mass destruction were to be deployed or if large-scale refugee movements were to occur (Interview 13—99, Tokyo, January 14, 1999). After expressing initially strong reservations, South Korea has come to appreciate the considerations that have pushed Japan to acquiesce in US pressure to revise the defense guidelines, especially since the historic visit of President Kim Dae Jung in Tokyo in October 1998 has improved diplomatic relations between the two states.7

Military toughness is not a recipe for Japan’s approach to China. For historical, political and military reasons China is a central challenge for Japan and Asian-Pacific regional security and in the long run probably more important than Korea (Green 1999; Christensen 1999). The change in the US–Japan security relationship was met with mixed emotions by Beijing’s policy elites. Condemnation of the new security guidelines adopted in September 1997 was swift. The changes were interpreted as inherently more aggressive in particular with respect to Japan’s ambiguous stance in case of an outbreak of hostilities between Taiwan and the PRC (Kynge 1999a). At the same time many members of China’s political and military leadership are fully aware of the stabilizing effects of the US–Japan security alliance (Christensen 1999: 58–9; Wang and Wu 1998; Ross 1999; Garrett and Glaser 1997; Interviews 01–98, 04–98 and 03–00, 04–00, Beijing, June 15 and 16, 1998, and June 13, 2000). Before 1995, Chinese policy elites were alarmed by the prospect that a fraying of the US–Japan relationship might remove the ‘bottle cap’ that had contained a possibly unilateral remilitarization of Japan. After 1995 they were equally concerned by the consolidation of the US–Japan relationship and the creation of an ‘egg shell’ which eventually would hatch, under US tutelage, a militarist and expansionary Japan in the Asia-Pacific (Christensen 1999: 59–62).

The issue that has Chinese officials concerned more than the possibility of Japan’s nuclearization is the development of weapon systems that are tailored to Japan’s proven strength in dual-use technologies such as Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems (Hildreth and Pagliano 1995; Cambone 1997; Green 1997; Crowell and Usui 1997).8 In the view of Japanese policymakers the joint research project with the US government on TMD is useful politically both in the short and medium term. In accommodating requests that the US government has made since 1993, TMD strengthens cooperative security arrangements with Japan’s most important partner,
and it responds to the strong sense of worry of the Japanese public over the 1998 North Korean missile test. But this policy also affects political developments in the Asia-Pacific even without Japan altering its traditional policy of barring the export of military technologies to all countries except to the United States (Interviews 03–99 and 04–99, Tokyo, January 12, 1999; Interview 03–00, Tokyo, January 11, 2000). Specifically, TMD further complicates Japan’s relations with the PRC, which have already been clouded by the new guidelines. It will also strain Japan’s defense budgets with R&D expenditures over five years expected to run in the range of 20–30 billion yen (Mainichi Daily News, August 14, 1999). Considering the system’s uncertain technical prospects, a decision on deployment will most likely be delayed for at least a decade (Interviews 01–99 and 02–99, Tokyo, January 11, 1999; Interview 05–00, Tokyo, January 12, 2000; Sims 1999).

For various reasons, Japan’s decision to participate in TMD research has aroused strong Chinese opposition. The fact that TMD is perceived to be linked to an intense discussion in Washington and a likely US decision on the building of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system makes it unpalatable to China, as well as Russia, France and most other European states. China in particular objects to the TMD on political–military grounds and also because of possible technological spillover effects from one program to the other (Interview 12–00, Tokyo, January 14, 2000). From the Chinese perspective the notion that weapons, such as TMD, are inherently defensive rings hollow. TMD would strengthen the hand of the Taiwanese government in its quest for sovereign statehood, an inherently aggressive act from the perspective of the PRC. Introduced into a specific political and historical context, a jointly developed and produced US–Japanese TMD system, from the perspective of Beijing thus is a factor seriously destabilizing Asian-Pacific security. To be sure TMD had been on the agenda of the US and Japan since 1993, long before the Nye Report; Japan has been reluctant to commit itself to the project; and Japanese policy changed only after a North Korean missile test across Japanese territory on August 31, 1998. These facts are recognized in Beijing. But they are judged to be much less consequential than the fact that TMD might counter missiles as the pre-eminent military asset the PRC possesses in its relations with Taiwan (Christensen 1999: 64–9; Dickie and Fidler 1999; Walker and Fidler 1999; Kynge 1999b; Wiltse 1997).

The importance of bilateral relations with the US fit a broader pattern of Japan’s security policy. Senior JDA officials have met annually between 1993 and 1997, and again in 1999 with their Chinese counterparts, with the 1998 hiatus most likely occasioned by the adoption of the New Guidelines (Interview 13–00, Tokyo, January 14, 2000). Besides China, Japan has initiated also regular bilateral security talks with Australia (since 1996), Singapore (since 1997), Indonesia (since 1997), Thailand (since 1998) and Malaysia (since 1999). Japan’s JDA is increasingly engaging the Asia-Pacific in a broad range of bilateral security contacts (Interviews
In sum in the 1990s regionalization has increased in Japan’s external security affairs.

3. Informal bilateralism and Japan’s internal security policies

Compared to formal bilateralism on issues of external security, on questions affecting Japan’s internal security the government has responded through informal bilateral arrangements to the actual or perceived growth of transnational organized crime. In the Asia-Pacific, problems such as illegal immigration, organized crime, money laundering, narcotics and terrorism remain almost without exception under the exclusive prerogative of national governments. But the Japanese police has begun to cultivate systematically its contacts with foreign law enforcement agencies on a bilateral basis. Japanese policy aims at increasing trust among police professionals throughout the region, thus creating a general climate in which Japan’s police can cooperate more easily with foreign police forces on an ad hoc basis. Put briefly, on a case-by-case basis Japanese police organizations are attempting to share more freely information with other police forces in the Asia-Pacific.

Japan’s crime syndicates, or yakuza, make the most of their money inside Japan, traditionally in gambling, prostitution, racketeering and extortion, especially in the entertainment and construction industries. With the advent of the bubble economy in the late 1980s the syndicates entered Japan’s corporate world on a large scale. David Kaplan estimates that despite Japan’s prolonged recession in the 1990s, the net worth of the syndicates doubled between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s. Easy loans, especially in real estate and the securities industry, created a new type of economic gangster in Japan. Some estimates put the direct and indirect share of uncollectible bank loans to the yakuza at 40 per cent of the estimated total of about 1 trillion dollars of bad loans held by Japanese banks. In the views of several observers Japan was experiencing in the 1990s an economic recession prolonged not only by the blunders of party politicians and the mismanagement of Ministry of Finance bureaucrats but also by the hesitation of bankers, intimidated by the occasional murder, to push the mob to pay up. This delayed further the banks’ interest in beginning the process of writing off bad loans (Kaplan 1996: 3, 6; Friman 1999: 6; Takayama 1995; Fulford 1995).

Japan’s crime syndicates have important international connections throughout the Asia-Pacific that net annually large amounts of revenues (Flynn 1998: 25–6). Links to the Chinese triads, for example, date back to the Pacific War and the Japanese occupation of China. Recruiting among Japan’s heavily discriminated Korean minority, Japanese crime syndicates also have close ties to Korea where yakuza-financed laboratories used to supply most of the world’s market for crystal methamphetamine. In Taiwan,
Thailand and the Philippines Japan’s crime syndicates have organized a burgeoning sex tourism. And Hawaii’s real estate market became a convenient place for laundering illegal funds in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Japan’s NPA seeks to cooperate with the law enforcement agencies of other countries primarily by cultivating a systematic exchange of information. The NPA is most satisfied with the good working relations it has established with Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan; it is very eager to build up its contacts with police officials from Fujian province (Interview 09–99 and 10–99, Tokyo, January 13, 1999); and it funds projects that bring Japanese researchers to provinces in northeast China, relying on existing Chinese contacts, to build closer ties with provincial police forces while investigating the local conditions that permit China’s crime syndicates to operate in Japan (Interview 04–00, Tokyo, January 12, 2000).

Like the Chinese triads and organized crime in other Asia-Pacific states Japan’s crime syndicates are deeply involved in the international drug trade (Shinn 1998a). Japanese crime groups have strong transnational links and cooperate with organized crime in Thailand, Hong Kong, Taiwan and China (Friman 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996). In the 1990s all of the methamphetamine, Japan’s drug of choice, comes from abroad, much of it from Fujian province, compared to Taiwan in the 1980s and South Korea in the 1970s. International syndicates handle transshipment, illegal immigrants, often of Iranian origin, street-level distribution. Japan’s yakuza acts as an intermediary and derives about one-third of its total revenues from drugs (Interview 06–99, Tokyo, January 13, 1999). Since the NPA lacks the power and resources of an organization such as the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), it also lacks precise estimates of the flow of drugs into Japan. But it is clear that Japan’s high living standard make it an attractive market for international drug dealers (Interview 06–99, Tokyo, January 13, 1999; Kristof 1999b).

Most of the practical police work is facilitated by personal relationships with law enforcement officials from other countries, especially China, Thailand, Taiwan, Burma, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. In the view of the NPA, bilateral police relations are good or excellent with the members of ASEAN, South Korea and the United States. High-level contacts with Taiwan work well but the problems of Taiwan’s ambiguous diplomatic status severely constrain practical police cooperation at lower levels. And relations with China are difficult since the vast bureaucracy of China’s Public Security Department exercises strong, central control over localities such as Fujian where drugs are produced and shipped to Japan. The ministry’s insistence on strict observance of all formalities seriously undermines practical police cooperation (Interview 06–99, Tokyo, January 13, 1999). In sum, international drug trafficking by crime syndicates is spreading in the Asia-Pacific. In response, Japan’s NPA seeks to build informal cooperative relations with foreign law enforcement officials rather than ceding national sovereignty to formal, multilateral institutions.
Since 1996 the smuggling of illegal immigrants has become a problem that Japan's police officials are forced to pay growing attention to (Friman 1998, 2000a, 2000b). Even though the sharpest increases in the arrests of Chinese occurred in the early 1990s, the NPA has only since 1998 intensified its contacts with Chinese police officials. One reason was the extreme caution with which the NPA's Security Bureau had traditionally viewed the building of cooperative ties with police officials from China. But with the problem of illegal immigration perceived as becoming very serious by 1996, the Security Bureau's opposition has weakened. Since May 1997 the NPA has sought semi-annually to develop cooperative ties at the deputy-chief level.

Even more significant is the beginning of joint operation of the Japanese and Chinese police. The NPA has acted as an intermediary for the cooperation between prefectural police departments with the Hong Kong police since 1997 and with Canton and Shanghai police forces since 1998, leading to several arrests (Interviews 08–99 and 10–99, Tokyo, January 13, 1999; Hirano 1998: 45–6). NPA officials met their Shanghai and Cantonese counterparts after having built up their ties with the Hong Kong police prior to 1997. They are now very interested in creating closer personal relations with police forces in Fujian so as to facilitate future joint operations (Interview 10–99, Tokyo, January 13, 1999).

The dramatic decline by the Japan Red Army (JRA), marked by the arrest of nine JRA members since 1995, has not ended the perceived threat that terrorism poses to Japan. In the 1990s Japan has had to cope with some spectacular acts of terrorism both at home (Aum Shinrikyo's sarin gas attack in Tokyo's subway in 1995) and abroad (the attack on the Japanese embassy in Lima in 1996). The target of the NPA's concern is shifting from the JRA to North Korea and to fundamentalist Islamic groups (Interview 07–99, Tokyo, January 13, 1999). In line with its policy on other security issues the NPA has sought vigorously to increase trust through the strengthening of bilateral contacts with foreign police professionals and the systematic exchange of information.

Japanese police officers also seek to gather systematic intelligence abroad. More than 100 police officers stationed at Japanese embassies practice cooperative security with local police forces in the host countries. In response to the takeover of the Japanese embassy in Lima, Peru, a terror response team (TRT) was set up in the spring of 1998. It will be dispatched in future crises when Japanese nationals are threatened by international terrorism. The unit trains abroad, and it exchanges information with corresponding units in other countries (Interview 07–99, Tokyo, January 13, 1999).

Japan's anti-terrorism policy displays clearly the characteristic features of its preferred approach to issues of internal security (Leheny 2000). Multilateral international or regional institutions are relatively unimportant in Japan's approach. Interpol, for example, is of secondary importance.
in the eyes of NPA officials, even though the director-general of the NPA’s International Affairs Department, Toshinori Kanemoto, became the head of Interpol in 1996. On questions of organized crime Interpol does not provide the police with sensitive information. On questions of drug trafficking its information, at best, duplicates what police officers learn through other channels. On questions of illegal immigration Interpol is largely useless. And in Japan’s anti-terrorism policy its main function is restricted to the posting of international arrest warrants (Interviews 06–99 and 10–99, Tokyo, January 13, 1999).

In sum, informal bilateralism has been the most important response to the regional spread of transnational crime. The increasing importance of Asia-Pacific regionalism is noticeable in the intensified efforts of the NPA to create more trust through the improvement of its bilateral ties with national police forces throughout the Asia-Pacific.

4. Incipient multilateralism in Japan’s external and internal security policies

Formal and informal bilateral arrangements in Japan’s external and internal security policies shape an incipient form of multilateralism that covers a broad spectrum of different admixtures of bilateral and multilateral elements in the Asia-Pacific’s security affairs. Multilateral security arrangements cross the gamut of Track One (government-to-government), Track Two (semi-governmental think tanks), and Track Three (private institutions) (Stone 1997; Wada 1998). The institutional affiliation of national research organizations participating in Track Two activities confounds the attempt of drawing a sharp line between governmental Track One and non-governmental Track Two activities. It varies from being integral to the ministries of foreign affairs (the two Koreas, China and Laos), to being totally (Vietnam) or partly (Japan) funded and largely (Vietnam) or moderately (Japan) staffed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to very close proximity to the prime minister (Malaysia), to high degrees of independence (Thailand and Indonesia) (Interview 04–00, Tokyo, January 12, 2000). Whatever their precise character, for most Japanese officials, dialogues that involve semi-official or private contacts are useful to the extent that they help facilitate government-to-government talks; they are not of value in and of themselves (Interview 01–00, Tokyo, January 11, 2000).

Japan’s interest in and support of stronger multilateral arrangements dates back to the 1960s when its neighbors in Southeast Asia rejected several Japanese proposals to create multilateral economic arrangements (Katzenstein 1997: 12–20). The Japanese government supported the creation of ASEAN and saw it as a useful arrangement to help stabilize Southeast Asia after the end of the Vietnam War. Prime Minister Tanaka’s 1974 visit in the region was the first occasion at which the Japanese govern-
ment referred to ASEAN as a collective political institution rather than to Southeast Asia as a geographic area (Interview 02–00, Tokyo, January 11, 2000). Before 1989, like the US, but sometimes for different reasons, Japan had no interest in regional security institutions. Looking for a new diplomatic initiative in the wake of the Gulf War and convinced that the cause of Asia-Pacific regionalism was ready to be advanced further diplomatically, in July 1991 the Japanese government proposed a new multilateral security dialogue as part of ASEAN’s Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) (Fukushima 1999a: 143; Interview 02–00, Tokyo, January 11, 2000). The proposal by Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama, writes Paul Midford (1998: 2), ‘represented a dramatic departure from Japan’s reactive policy toward regional security, and marked the first time since the end of World War II that Japan made a regional security initiative on its own, and without American support’.

Although the Nakayama initiative proved unacceptable to ASEAN members, it did have a threefold effect. It prompted ASEAN to push ahead with its own plans for setting up a multilateral security institution as part of the ASEAN PMC; it contributed to a rapid shift in the hostile stance of the US government toward multilateral security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific; and it prepared the grounds for further diplomatic initiatives by Prime Minister Miyazawa on multilateral regional security initiatives and the growth of multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s. By the end of the decade, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and JDA had become interested in pushing from ‘confidence- and security-building measures’ based on a sharing of information by various participating states about each other’s defense posture to ‘preventive diplomacy’ as one way of solving some of the harder security problems in the Asia-Pacific. With varying degrees of enthusiasm the Japanese government has supported all of the new multilateral initiatives and has thus followed the recommendations of the Advisory Group on Defense Issues (Cronin and Green 1994).

This is not to argue that there were no domestic divisions in Japan. Security multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific meant different things to different groups (Kawasaki 1997). ‘Realists’ viewed all the talk about cooperative security and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as one additional tool for practicing balance-of-power politics with China (Interviews 04–99 and 12–99, Tokyo, January 12 and 14, 1999). ‘Idealists’ welcomed the ARF as a promising way of moving the Asia-Pacific away from traditional power politics towards the growth of one or several overlapping security communities that might eventually transcend the system of competing alliances. Finally, ‘realistic liberals’ in the MOFA who were crafting the new policy hoped to increase Asia-Pacific stability through institutionalized ways of enhancing transparency and trust (Interview 11–99, Tokyo, January 14, 1999). ‘Their conception of the ARF was an amalgamation of Idealism and Realism: a sort of international community
in the narrow realm of information sharing, beneath which the cold reality of power politics and alliance systems persist’ (Kawasaki 1997: 495). On balance, Japan’s approach to multilateralism has been cautious.

The incipient security multilateralism of the Asia-Pacific takes somewhat different forms. It is, for example, evident in the recent history of several Track Two dialogues. They provide a convenient venue for senior government officials to meet in relatively informal settings. Since 1993, for example, Japan has cooperated with China, Russia, South Korea and the US in the North East Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD). In addition since 1994 a Japanese research organization has co-sponsored, with its American and Russian counterparts, the Trilateral Forum on North Pacific Security also attended by senior government officials. Furthermore since 1998 Japan has conducted semi-official trilateral security talks with China and the US (Asahi Shimbun, July 16, 1998, 14th edition; Japan Times, September 28, 1999; Fukushima 1999b: 36; Sasaki 1997).

On questions of Asian-Pacific security, however, the most important Track Two dialogues occur in the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) (Interview 04–00, Tokyo, January 12, 2000; Simon 2001: 20–2 (prepublication manuscript); Stone 1997: 21–5; Wada 1998: 162–5; Job 2000). Its predecessors were the ASEAN-associated Institutes for Strategic and International Studies. In the early 1990s these institutes played a crucial role in pushing ASEAN to commence systematic security dialogues. And with the establishment of the Track One ARF, the Track Two activities of these institutes have grown in importance. They prepare studies that may be too sensitive for governments to conduct. And they organize meetings on topics that for political reasons governments may be unwilling or unable to host. CSCAP was created in 1993, and held its first meeting in 1994. It incorporated these institutes into a larger non-governmental body with a membership that was nearly coterminous with that of the ARF. It is ‘the most comprehensive, regular, non-governmental forum on Pacific security’ (Simon 2001: 21). With its five working groups CSCAP-sponsored dialogues were modelled after those in the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) that bring together, since 1980, business people, government officials in their private capacity and academic economists (Fukushima 1999a: 131, 154–5; 1999b: 33).

Track Two activities thus can offer governments a variety of informal venues to exchange information and to take stock of the evolving assessments of a variety of governmental and non-governmental actors. Track Two activities also help shape the climate of opinion in national settings in which security affairs are conducted. They can help in articulating new ideas for national decision-makers. Over time they may socialize elites either directly or indirectly to different norms and identities. And they may also build transnational coalitions of elites that retain considerable influence in their respective national arenas. In brief, they have become an important aspect of Asian-Pacific security affairs.
Multilateral Track Two activities advance also a variety of specific political objectives. All ARF members, for example, are interested in modifying China’s political aims through a strategy of engagement (Interviews 03–00, Tokyo, January 11, 1999; 03–98, Beijing, June 15, 1998; and 06–00, Beijing, June 14, 2000; Johnston and Ross 1999; Johnston 1999: 304–15). The Chinese government puts a high premium on its international standing which is influenced in part by its conduct in regional organizations such as the ARF (Interviews 03–98, 05–98, 06–98 and 08–98 and 03–00, Beijing, June 15, 19 and 21, 1998, and June 13, 2000). Both factors, Alastair Johnston (1999) argues, have helped advance the evolution of the ARF’s institutionalization since 1994. China’s decision to become a member was a boost for the ARF. After initial opposition China also responded to Japan’s suggestion, as part of an ARF initiative, of publishing at least a skeletal National Defense White Paper. This is an indication of a slight shift in China’s security policy that reflects its sensitivity to at least some international suggestions; it may augur well for China’s willingness to consider giving further support to ARF or other multilateral arrangements some time in the future. Even without a major crisis, such as over Taiwan, China’s approach to multilateral security arrangements retains a strong unilateral bent (Interviews 02–00, 03–00, 08–00 and 11–00, Tokyo, January 11 and 13, 2000).

Like China, the US also has come to support multilateral security institutions in the Asia-Pacific (Acharya 2000a: 12). This change dates back to the late 1980s and the end of the Cold War. For a variety of reasons the United States embraced a regional strategy in North America, the Western hemisphere and the Asia-Pacific. The shift was gradual. US grand strategy accepted at the global level regionalism as complementary to its traditional emphasis on universalism. And in the Asia-Pacific it supported multilateral arrangements as complementary but subordinate to established bilateral security treaties. The growing US toleration of and interest in the ARF reflects this change in policy.

Since the mid-1980s a multilateralism centering on the US military has also become important for the armed forces throughout the Asia-Pacific including Japan’s (Interview 10–00, Tokyo, January 14, 2000). Since 1986, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC), for example, has brought together military and civilian officials from about fifteen Asia-Pacific countries in a ‘Seminar for East Asian Security’ that was designed primarily to socialize the different militaries. The intent of the US was to increase the level of reassurance and knowledge in the area. In 1994, the US set up an Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Honolulu which is offering a variety of short-term, mid-career courses largely for professional military personnel. The US-sponsored Pacific Air Force Chief of Staff Conference (PACC) is held every other year. In the fall of 2000 Japan co-hosted in Tokyo with the US the US-sponsored Pacific Army Management Seminar (PAMS) which brought together officers from thirty to forty states.
Multilateral meetings among officers that are orchestrated by the US military are complemented by the initiatives of some governments in the Asia-Pacific. Through the renegotiation of military base arrangements, Singapore, for example, has sought to ensure that the US navy remained engaged in maritime Asia-Pacific – since the late 1980s a double hedge against both China’s rising political aspirations and Japan’s growing economic weight.

Japan’s SDF plays a very circumscribed role in such multilateral meetings. At ARF sessions the SDF is represented by JDA officials. Members of the SDF participate in intersessional working groups when technical issues are being discussed (Interview 10–00, Tokyo, January 14, 2000). But at the civilian level, the sheer scarcity of resources and manpower constrains the degree of involvement of JDA in multilateral meetings. Even within these constraints, the scales are tilted heavily in favor of the political side. MOFA sends very senior officials to the annual ARF meetings while JDA is represented by less senior personnel.

East Timor illustrates the circumscribed role of the JDA in UN-sponsored multilateral peacekeeping operations. Japanese security policy is based on the premise that East Timor and Kosovo, though regionally specific, raise more general issues of international security that require action by the international community rather than regional segmentation (Interview 08–00, Tokyo, January 13, 2000). Yet it was only in mid-November 1999, two and a half months after the East Timorese referendum on August 30, that the cabinet decided on the sending of Japanese personnel to assist this international effort. In the absence of a declared ceasefire between the opposing sides, under the restrictions of Japan’s 1992 International Peace Cooperation Law the government was prohibited from sending peacekeeping or humanitarian aid missions to East Timor. According to a top unnamed JDA official, East Timor had requested that aid be delivered by ‘an Asian nation that is racially similar . . . instead of Australian troops’ (Maeda 1999). Compared to the opposition aroused in many quarters in the Asia-Pacific that Australia’s active and high-profile role engendered, despite its direct participation in the UN peacekeeping operation, Japan’s $100 million support of an intervention force staffed by ASEAN member states, and its pursuit of quiet diplomacy, shielded it from international criticism. It probably consolidated further Japan’s political position in Southeast Asia, despite its inability to contribute directly to the UN peacekeeping operation.

Questions of internal security also show incipient forms of multilateralism that reflect a mixture of bilateral and multilateral elements. International meetings are of increasing importance at the professional police level. The annual number of international meetings attended by senior NPA officials has increased from about two or three in the 1970s to about ten in the 1990s (Interview 07–99, Tokyo, January 13, 1999). Since 1989, for example, the NPA has hosted annually a three-day meeting on
organized crime. Funded by Japan’s foreign aid program this meeting is designed to strengthen cooperative police relationships that facilitate the exchange of information.\textsuperscript{36} Although more formal multilateral institutional activities matter much less on questions of internal security, they do occasionally occur.\textsuperscript{37} Confronting its third wave of stimulant abuse since 1945, Japan convened an Asian Drug Law Enforcement Conference in Tokyo in the winter of 1999.\textsuperscript{38} At that meeting, the director of the UN Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNDCP) chastised the Japanese government for its limited commitment to curtailing multilaterally the regional trafficking in methamphetamine (Friman 1999). The NPA attended as an observer a May 1999 meeting in which the five Southeast Asian countries and China formally approved an international police strategy (Haraguchi 1999: 36–7). And it organized in January 2000 a conference, attended by officials from thirty-seven countries, on how police cooperation could stem the spread of narcotics (\textit{Asahi Evening News}, January 28, 2000).

Because terrorism is a direct threat to the state, it has been a subject of high-level political meetings of heads of state. In this area, as in the area of multilateral security, Japan has actively sought to create regional institutions.\textsuperscript{39} But this is a recent and tentative move. On questions of internal security the absence of multilateral regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific remains striking, especially in comparison to Europe. A recent inventory of a number of transnational crime problems lists several global institutional fora in which these issues are addressed but in addition to CSCAP’s working group on transnational crime for the Asia-Pacific there is only one regional one, the ASEAN Ministry on Drugs (ASOD) (Shinn 1998b: 170–1).

On questions of both internal and external security the Asia-Pacific’s incipient multilateralism and entrenched bilateralism do not contradict one another (Capie \textit{et al.} 1998: 7–8, 16–17, 60–2, \textit{IV/3–4, 7}). Amitav Acharya (1990: 1–12; 2000b: 18) speaks of an interlocking ‘spider-web’ form of bilateralism that compensates in part for the absence of multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. In the 1960s and 1970s, anti-Communism provided the political base that allowed joint police operations and the right for cross-border ‘hot pursuits’ of Communist guerillas, for example, between Malaysia and Indonesia as well as Malaysia and Thailand. What was true of internal security in the 1960s and 1970s is to some extent true of external security in the 1990s. The North Korean crisis illustrates, as Michael Stankiewicz (1998: 2) observes, ‘the increasing complementarity between bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts in Northeast Asia’. Improvement in various bilateral relations in the Asia-Pacific, occasioned by the conflict on the Korean Peninsula, is fostering a gradual strengthening of multilateral security arrangements such as the NEACD and KEDO. The potential for a flash-point crisis between North Korea and its neighbors thus is a source for strengthening
nascent multilateral security arrangements in Northeast Asia. In April 1999, for example, Japan, South Korea and the US created the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group to orchestrate policy towards North Korea. Japanese diplomacy thus is beginning to make new connections between bilateral and multilateral security dialogues (Interviews 02–99 and 05–99, Tokyo, January 11–12, 1999).

Japan’s external and internal security policies bring together politicians and professionals in region-wide Track One, Track Two and ad hoc meetings. A growth of Asian regionalization in the 1990s is unmistakable in this incipient multilateralism. It reflects a complex mixture of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral aspects. More often than not Japanese policy and Asian-Pacific multilateralism aim at enhancing trust through transparency rather than at transforming state identities.

5. Conclusion

Multilateralism is often understood to refer to the coordination of national policies in groups of three or more states (Keohane 1990). Some scholars such as David Twining (1998: 3) argue that we need to look beyond formal structures to the content and nature of state interactions in a ‘qualitative’ multilateralism. This comes quite close to John Ruggie’s (1992; Sewell 2000) insistence on the existence of collective norms and social purposes as a defining criterion of multilateralism. Proponents of critical security studies go further. Brought together for a large research project under the leadership of Robert Cox, they insist instead that a ‘new multilateralism’ links structural change in world order to the emergence of new multilateral practices shaped in particular by a growing number of nongovernmental organizations (Cox 1997: xvii, xix, xxiv; Schedtcher 1999: 3–5). Concurrent developments in global and local politics encourage a move ‘beyond multilateralism [which] must embrace new forms and the widest possible participation, particularly by nongovernmental organizations’ (Twining 1998: 143).

The data in this paper suggest that such movement is not discernible in the security affairs of Japan and the Asia-Pacific. The virtual absence of Track Three activities on security issues is an indication that no qualitatively new multilateralism has yet taken hold in the Asia-Pacific. Instead, full-blown region-wide intergovernmental dialogues, Track Two processes, and bi- or trilateral coordination mechanisms all constitute Asian-Pacific multilateralism in its incipient form. For Track One and Track Two are impossible to distinguish empirically.

Multilateralism often cannot do without bilateralism for reasons of interpersonal relations and mass psychology (Bredow 1996: 109–10). In the case of Japan and the Asia-Pacific, an even more important reason is that multilateralism is not yet a strong and unquestioned collectively held norm either in Tokyo or in any of the other capitals in the Asia-Pacific, not to
speak of the fact that non-state actors have acquired no institutionalized standing on security issues. What matters instead is a layering of bilateral and multilateral state policies as the foundation for an incipient security multilateralism.

The distinctiveness of that multilateralism is readily apparent in comparative perspective. Intrusive or transformative multilateralism European-style is not in evidence on questions of Asian-Pacific security. Instead what matters are political practices shaped by a strong tradition of bilateralism and only very recently by an incipient multilateralism. Japanese security policies thus reflect and shape the Asia-Pacific’s emerging security order.

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Notes

1 The report suggested four components which were designed to support US interests in a stable and peaceful Asia-Pacific: maintenance of the forward deployment of US forces in the Asia-Pacific; strengthening of multilateral arrangements in the Asia-Pacific; an adaptation of US alliances, especially with Japan, to the new conditions after the Cold War; and, finally, encouragement of China to define its interests in ways that would be compatible with US interests (Nye 1997; Department of Defense 1995, 1998).

2 The previous agreement signed in 1996 had stipulated that the SDF and the US military could provide each other with supplies and services in joint exercises, UN peacekeeping operations, and international humanitarian relief operations. Supplies and services covered by the agreement included, among others, fuel, food, medical support, transportation, but not ammunition (Gaiko Forum 1997: 77).

3 The SDF’s provision of weapons and ammunition to the US military, and the US military’s provision of weapon systems and ammunition to the SDF, are beyond the scope of the agreement (Gaiko Forum 1999: 139).

4 SDF responsibilities in the new guidelines came to include, among others, intelligence gathering and sharing, rear area support, and manning search-and-rescue operations. The review also committed the Japanese government politically to permit US forces to utilize civilian airports, harbors and private sector assets (Okimoto 1998: 27).
Another change in the revised legislation required prior approval by the Diet of the SDF’s rear area support and search-and-rescue operations. In crisis situations, the government has the right to initiate such operations without Diet approval; but the Diet can subsequently refuse its approval and terminate an ongoing operation (Asahi Shimbun, April 26, 1999, 16th edition).

These parties had considerable support among the voters on this issue. In a public opinion poll taken in March 1999, 37 per cent of the respondents supported and 43 per cent opposed the bill. Even among the supporters of the LDP, only 50 per cent were for, and 34 per cent against it (Asahi Shimbun, March 19, 1999, 14th edition).

Military-to-military contacts have expanded greatly since 1999. The two navies have initiated joint military exercises. And the two governments have opened three hotlines between Japan and South Korea to facilitate rapid communications in the case of an incursion of their air space or territorial waters (Interview 12–99, Tokyo, January 14, 1999). These lines have become operational since May 1999 (Boeicho 1999: 177).

In the view of the US media Japan overreacted to the North Korean missile test of 1998; but in the view of Japanese observers it is the United States that is overexploiting that test politically in using it as the occasion for embarking on a National Missile Defense (NMD) program (Interview 04–00, Tokyo, January 12, 2000). It should be noted that the term TMD is itself contentious. The Japanese government prefers the term ‘Ballistic Missile Defense’ as the focus of ‘TMD’ is on the defense of US military forces stationed abroad (Boeicho 1999: 133).

However, that opposition appears not to have been voiced frequently in bilateral contacts at either bureaucratic or political levels in 1999 (Interview 03–00, Tokyo, January 11, 1999).

These meetings bring together from each country 5–6 persons in ‘political–military talks’ (involving both defense and foreign affairs officials), and 3–4 professional military personnel in ‘military-to-military talks’ (involving only defense officials) (Boeicho 1999: 185; Defense Agency 1998: 171; Interview 02–99, Tokyo, January 11, 1999; Daily Yomiuri, February 4, 1997). Military officers of the SDF also have been engaging in ‘unit-to-unit exchanges’ with their counterparts in Russia, South Korea and Southeast Asian countries (Boeicho 1999: 177–8, 180, 184; Defense Agency 1998: 167–9).

It is worth noting that as Japanese public opinion became less critical, military officers have been more free to travel abroad, not only to far-away places in Europe as in the 1970s and 1980s but to neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific. With the tightening of US–Japan security relations after 1994, Japan has become more self-conscious in developing a broad set of bilateral defense talks and exchanges that complement Japan’s persistent dependence on the US and also serve the purpose of cementing the presence of the US in the region. By 1999, Japan was committed to about ten regular bilateral talks, too many for the two officials that the JDA had assigned to this role. India, for example, was interested in commencing bilateral defense consultation, but Japan stalled, not for reasons of policy but simply because of resource constraints (Interview 13–00, Tokyo, January 14, 2000).

This intensification of bilateral contacts builds on a small foundation of transnational police links that Japan’s National Police Agency (NPA) had developed before the 1990s. For example, the NPA has organized short-term training courses for small numbers of police officials from other Asian-Pacific states dealing with drug offenses (since 1962), criminal investigations (since 1975), organized crime (since 1988), police administration (since 1989), and community policing (since 1989) (National Police Agency 1998: 62). Furthermore,
Japan also runs regular seminars dealing with criminal justice issues which are attended by officials from other countries. Finally, Japanese experts travel to various countries in the Asia-Pacific to train local law enforcement personnel. These seminars and visits serve the purpose of enhancing the capacity of Asia-Pacific police forces, spreading information and establishing contacts that might be useful in subsequent, ad hoc coordinations of police work across national borders (National Police Agency 1997a: 95–9; Donnelly 1986: 628; Katzenstein 1996: 68–71).

13 The NPA’s offensive against the yakuza and affiliated groups has not altered the fact that, as long as it respects some rules of the game, organized crime in Japan is a tolerated part of society. Even high officials of the NPA do not expect that their efforts will reduce the important role Japan’s organized crime syndicates had come to play by the mid-1990s (Interview 09–99, Tokyo, January 13, 1999).

14 Since the beginning of the 1980s, three to four bilateral meetings a year, most importantly with police officials from Hong Kong, the United States and China, have offered a useful, informal venue for focusing on concrete cases, such as the smuggling of illegal immigrants.

15 In 1998, the NPA organized its 36th seminar for middle-level officials, with the two-week time divided equally between formal meetings and informal socializing and sightseeing. US law enforcement officials attend these meetings as observers, paying for their own expenses, making presentations and occasionally joining the informal parts of the program (Interview 06–99, Tokyo, January 13, 1999).

16 From a figure close to zero in 1990, by 1997 the number of arrests of illegal entrants had increased to 1,360, most of them Chinese. According to police estimates this is less than a quarter of the total number of illegal entrants (Ishii 1998). Chinese crime syndicates charge about $35,000 for a successful transfer, with payment to be made in China. Furthermore, by overstaying in Japan about 271,000 foreigners are in violation of visa laws (Interview 10–99, Tokyo, January 13, 1999; Keisatsucho 1999: 17).

17 These meetings were followed by ministerial-level exchanges between the Chair of the National Public Safety Commission of Japan, Home Affairs Minister Mitsuhiro Uesugi, and the Chief of the Public Security Department of China, Jia Chuwang in May 1998, and exchanges between Keizo Obuchi and Jiang Zemin who discussed transnational crime during their November 1998 summit meeting (Interviews 09–99 and 10–99, Tokyo, January 13, 1999; National Police Agency n.d.). In August 1999, Jia visited Japan and discussed transnational crime with Obuchi. This was the first time a chief of the Public Security Department visited Japan (Asahi Shimbun, August 27, 1999, 12th edition). The following month Uesugi’s successor Takeshi Noda met Jia in Beijing, and discussed, among other things, drug crimes and people smuggling (Asahi Evening News, September 15, 1999).

18 Because terrorism is a direct threat to the state, it has been an important item of the G7/G8 since the mid-1990s, as the agendas of recent summit meetings in Ottawa (December 1995), Sharm-el-Sheik (March 1996), Paris (July 1996), Denver (June 1997) and Cologne (1999) indicate.

19 It runs two types of annual meetings in Tokyo. Funded by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) since 1995 the NPA has hosted an annual two-week seminar on anti-terrorism attended by one or two high- and middle-level police officials from ten to fifteen states of the Asia-Pacific and other regions. And since 1993 the NPA also organizes more intensive, smaller seminars attended by two or three officials from three to five countries. In these seminars the Japanese government provides technical assistance on
counterterrorism to developing countries (Interview 07–99, Tokyo, January 13, 1999; Keisatsucho 1999: 231).

20 It complements the activities of seven metropolitan and prefectural assault teams, with about 200 members, set up in 1996. Since 1997 their activity is centrally coordinated by the NPA. These teams are being sent abroad for training (DailyYomiuri, August 13, 1997; Japan Times, August 30, 1997).

21 Since 1994, Track One and Track Two multilateral meetings are listed regularly (Dialogue Monitor 1995–98; Dialogue and Research Monitor 1999). The annual number of Track One meetings has varied between a high of 19 in 1999 and a low of 11 in 1998. Corresponding figures for Track Two meetings have fallen between a high of 93 in 1994 and a low of 47 in 1997. In addition there have been additional meetings (varying between a high of 31 in 1996 and a low of 12 in 1998) that do not fit the normal requirements of Track One or Two meetings. These data were kindly provided to us by Professor Brian Job (July 13, 2000).

How to count the number of different tracks is a matter of some disagreement among participants and observers. The line separating different tracks is blurred by the fact that government officials often attend Track Two meetings in their private capacity thus modifying the ‘private’ character of these meetings. This does not necessarily mean that officials are totally free to talk. Discussions are constrained by prior policies and by the information that is prepared prior to the meetings themselves. But since no verbatim minutes are kept, none of the individuals who participate in the discussion can be assigned any direct responsibility. While there is no formal debriefing by the JDA, the knowledge that individual officials gain is added informally to the information base that the JDA has at its disposal and that can be analyzed for almost any purpose (Interview 13–00, Tokyo, January 14, 2000).

22 Track Two institutions thus tend to support rather than undermine the state. There are instances where we should think of them not as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) but as governmentally organized NGOs (GONGOs). In many states in the Asia-Pacific, the divide between public and private is easily bridged. Prominent businessmen and scholars, nominally in the private sector, are often linked informally to politicians and bureaucrats whose attendance at Track Two meetings in their ‘private’ capacity is polite fiction. Hence the choice between the multilateralism of different tracks can be a matter of political convenience for states (Stone 1997: 9–19). But both the nature of private sector participants and the pattern of influence between such participants and their governments vary widely.

23 In the absence of the spread of a shared sense of community in all parts of the Asia-Pacific, some officials (at least in the Japanese government) remain skeptical of moving beyond CSBMs as do a number of other Asia-Pacific countries, including China (Interviews 11–00 and 13–00, Tokyo, January 14, 2000; Interviews 01–98, 02–98 and 03–98, Beijing, June 15, 1998).

24 It brings together senior government officials every eight months. The second meeting in May 1994 and the seventh meeting in December 1999 were both held in Tokyo (Boeicho 1999: 193; Fukushima 1999b: 34–5, 43; Gaiko Forum 1999: 155). Japan co-chairs NEACD’s Study Project on Defense Information Sharing (Fukushima 1999b: 35).

25 The first meeting in February 1994 and the sixth meeting in December 1998 were both held in Tokyo. The forum was originally proposed by Japan. From MOFA the director of the Security Policy Division in the Comprehensive Foreign Policy Bureau is the senior official attending meetings of both the NEACD and the forum (Boeicho 1999: 192–3; Fukushima 1996: 35–6, 43; Jo 1998b: 4; Gaiko Forum 1999: 155; Interview 7–00, Tokyo, January 13, 2000).
National committees and international working groups are common to both. Besides ASEAN members, Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, United States, China and others have also joined CSCAP. Rather than as members of a national delegation, Taiwanese participants attend in their personal capacity the sessions of the five working groups on maritime cooperation, security issues in the North Pacific, confidence- and security-building measures, comprehensive security and transnational crime. With Japan co-chairing together with Canada this particular committee, in 1995 and 1997, the North Pacific Working Group held two of its initial three meetings in Tokyo (Cossa 1999: 16; Fukushima 1999a: 131, 154-7; 1999b: 33). The eighth meeting of CSCAP’s steering committee was also held in Tokyo in December 1997 (Gaiko Forum 1999: 155).

The prospect of an increasing number of Track Three meetings would change the picture further.

Although reluctant to let China be tied down in any regional arrangement, some parts of the research and advisory community surrounding China’s foreign policy bureaucracy have become increasingly convinced of the advantages that multilateral arrangements hold forth for the pursuit of Chinese interests (Johnston and Evans 1999; Interviews 01-98, 02-98, 03-98, 04-98, 07-98, 08-98, 09-98, Beijing, June 15-16, 20-22, 1998). China, however, remains strongly opposed to have multilateral institutions such as the ARF or ASEM discuss any controversial territorial or political issues such as the Spratly Islands or Taiwan (Interviews 03-98, Beijing, June 15, 1998; 02-00, Tokyo, January 11, 2000; and 01-00, Beijing, June 13, 2000).

The first uniformed Japanese official attended the seminar in 1993.

Japan’s Air Self-Defense Forces have participated in the conference since its first meeting in 1989 (Defense Agency 1998: 177).

The Ground Self-Defense Forces have been participating in the seminar since its 17th meeting in 1993 (Defense Agency 1998: 176).

The intersessional working group in which the JDA has been most involved, however, was dealing with disaster relief and thus was staffed by several Asia-Pacific states by officials from, among others, their construction ministries. This was such a profound source of irritation for the JDA that it set up the Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region. Although not formally affiliated with the ARF, the membership of this Track One meeting is nearly identical with that of the ARF. Since 1996 it has met annually with member states typically sending representatives at the director-general and deputy director-general level (Boeicho 1999: 422; Defense Agency 1998: 372; Gaiko Forum 1999: 156; Interview 11-00, Tokyo, January 14, 2000).

In the ministerial and senior official meetings the foreign affairs officials do all the talking. The same applies to ASEAN countries, whose defense officials never talk at meetings at various levels while, as a matter of principle, the JDA representative will talk at least once during the one-and-a-half-day meeting of intersessional working groups. In the last set of talks, which Japan hosted in Tokyo in October 1999, an unofficial lunch only for defense officials was scheduled, to compensate for the silence defense officials endured. In the future, the JDA hopes this will become a permanent innovation at the intersessional working group-level talks (Interview 13-00, Tokyo, January 14, 2000).

On a humanitarian aid mission covered by the 1992 law, and under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, the main contingent of a 150-member Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) team left Japan in late November 1999 with relief for East Timorese refugees settled in West Timor camps.
In fact Japan funded 95 per cent of the cost of the operation, with Portugal contributing an additional $5 million and Switzerland $0.5 million; this display of European tightfistedness contrasts sharply with Japan’s substantial ($240 million) support for the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo (Interview 03–99, Tokyo, January 11, 1999).

Attempting to build more cooperative international police relations to suppress the smuggling of narcotics, after consultations with the DEA, the NPA has begun since 1996 to host annually two meetings in Tokyo. Each meeting involves about 40–50 high-level police officials, one with China in attendance, the other with Taiwan. Each of the meetings lasts four days but the official part of the program consists of only a one-day plenary. The rest of the time is spent on group tours of Japanese police facilities, sightseeing and socializing (Interview 06–99, Tokyo, January 13, 1999).

For developments in ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific more generally see Calagan (2000). Some of Japan’s overseas development assistance, for example, is channeled to foreign law enforcement agencies dealing with international drug trafficking. And in March 1998 the NPA hosted the fourth meeting of an international conference on combating drugs attended by officials from the ICPO and twenty-six countries (Haraguchi 1999: 36).

The meeting was attended by five Southeast Asian-Pacific countries (Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, Burma and Cambodia), China, officials from the UN and observers from eight countries and the EU (Haraguchi 1999: 30, 36–7; Jo 1999; Masaki 1998b).

In June 1997, for example, the NPA was instrumental in helping create the ‘Japan and ASEAN Anti-Terrorism Network’. It strengthens cooperative ties among national police agencies, streamlines information gathering, and coordinates investigation when acts of terrorism occur. Following up on an initiative taken by Prime Minister Hashimoto while travelling through Southeast Asia in January 1997, the NPA and MOFA jointly hosted in October 1997 a Japan–ASEAN Conference on Counterterrorism for senior police and foreign affairs officials from nine ASEAN countries (National Police Agency 1998: 53; Interview 07–99, Tokyo, January 13, 1999). And in October 1998 the NPA and MOFA co-hosted a joint Asian Pacific–Latin American conference on counterterrorism. Based on the findings of the Peruvian hostage crisis it sought to strengthen international cooperation on anti-terrorist measures (Gaimusho 1999: 103–4; Hishinuma 1997; Keisatsucho 1999: 231).

The group decided to meet at least once every three months (Asahi Shimbun, April 26, 1999, evening 4th edition; Tainaka 2000).

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