"Why does Germany, the most powerful state in Europe, appear bent on giving up voluntarily its newly won sovereign power?" Part of the answer, Peter Katzenstein argues, is that the "Germans have eliminated the concept of 'power' from their political vocabulary. They speak the language of 'political responsibility' instead."

United Germany in an Integrating Europe

PETER J. KATZENSTEIN

Evolutionary changes in global and European politics have reawakened old fears about Europe's domination by an unpredictable German giant. But these changes have also fueled new hopes for Germany and Europe as models of political pluralism in a more peaceful and prosperous world. In a different era, Thomas Mann distinguished between the specter of the "Germanization" of Europe and the vision of a "Europeanization" of Germany. It is a mistake to decide between these two views based on the extrapolation of fears from the past or hopes for the future. It is more useful to treat them as templates that may help us in discerning a more complicated pattern linking Germany and Europe.

German unification and European integration were indelibly linked in 1989 and 1990. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's European partners gave their grudging, basic support for German unification in Strasbourg in December 1989. In return, Kohl agreed to back French President François Mitterrand's proposal to have the Intergovernmental Conference on the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) start as early as December 1990 rather than at some later, unspecified date, as Germany had previously preferred. And, by March 1990, when it had become clear that pressure for Germany's early unification was building much more quickly than Kohl, Mitterrand, or most of Europe's other leaders had expected, France predicated its support for an acceleration of the unification process on a German commitment to a second Intergovernmental Conference on political union that would encompass not only monetary and economic affairs but also foreign and security policy. This deal was approved politically by the European Council that met in Dublin in April 1990. It was then ratified in the Treaty on European Union, which amalgamated the proposals for economic and political union at Maastricht in December 1991. United Germany was thus to be embedded in an integrating Europe.

These diplomatic bargains point to two underlying questions. Why does Germany, the most powerful state in Europe, appear bent on giving up voluntarily its newly won sovereign power? And why have long-standing institutional inefficiencies not blocked advances in European integration? The answer to these two questions centers on a historic shift in the institutionalization of power in Germany and Europe, power that conventionally is measured in terms of material resources or bargaining strength.

The Germans have eliminated the concept of "power" from their political vocabulary. They speak the language of "political responsibility" instead. In his analysis of the taming of German power, Hans-Peter Schwarz has described a new forgetfulness of power that has replaced an old obsession with power. Some observers view this rhetorical turn as little more than a cynical ploy in which the old wolf has put on new sheep's clothes; here it is regarded as an indication of a deeper transformation in the style and substance of German and European politics. The culture of restraint that characterizes German foreign policy and the conscious avoidance of assuming a high profile and a strong leadership role.

1Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die Gezähmten Deutschen: Von der Machtpolitik zur Machtvergessenheit (The Tamed Germans: From an Obsession with Power to an Obliviousness of Power) (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1985).
in the European Union (EU) emanate from the same institutional source.

The German approach to power and the practices that sustain and reformulate it emphasize its "soft" institutional elements. Other views interpret German power differently. Some stress power as a form of domination from which actors can escape only by breaking the shackles that tie them down. Or they might stress contractual bargaining relationships in which the different parties gain, to different degrees, from making deals. Such views underline "hard" elements of power. In reality, soft and hard elements always blend. For example, in the summer of 1996, British tabloids stylized an English-German soccer match as a new "war," and the tabloids viewed Germany and Britain as the main protagonists in a diplomatic war over "beef derivatives" in the mad-cow disease saga. But, at the same time, the British and German foreign offices swapped officials as part of ongoing efforts to further European integration by exploring practical steps toward a unified European embassy.

The institutionalization of power is the most distinctive aspect of the relationship between Europe and Germany. Germany's willingness to give the smaller EU members disproportionate power is puzzling. Only by moving institutional power center stage can we hope to understand why Germany is willing to give up its new sovereign power or why institutional inefficiency has not stopped European integration. Because it takes the hard edges off hard power relations, the institutionalization of power matters. Over time institutions become actors themselves rather than mere constraints on other actors' preferences. They do so within particular normative contexts (of collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity), or for specific collective identities (such as varying constructions of statehood). Norms and identities typically have two effects. They enable actors by constituting them and thus shaping their interests. But they also constrain actor preferences.

In recent decades European states, especially Germany, have acquired collective identities that are significantly more international than before. In this situation power is a variable quantity. Parents may act against their individual interests to further the family's interest. What may look irrational for them as individuals can be quite rational from the perspective of the family, with which they also identify. Similarly, both the individual member states and the EU family can simultaneously gain or lose power.

"The term which captures most accurately the dominant character of the relationship between states and the region," concludes Paul Taylor, "is symbiosis. . . [T]here is no evidence to suggest that common arrangements could not be extended a very long way without necessarily posing any direct challenge to the sovereignty of states."2 James Caporaso concurs when he argues that "regional integration is not a zero-sum process. . . Analysts should not have to choose between intergovernmentalism and international forms of political activity. Both logics operate in the European polity."3 Nation-states are simultaneously "throwing out" functions to the supranational level and devolving responsibilities to subnational regions. In this view, power relations do not add to a fixed quantity that either resides in national states or gets transferred to a supranational center of decision making. This makes institutionalized power "soft" compared to other types of power.

Besides the internationalization of state identities, the softness of German power in Europe is also due to the institutional similarity of the EU and Germany. In both polities power is pooled, creating a European system of associated sovereignty and German semisovereignty. In both systems it is possible to exploit superior material resources and advantageous bargaining positions to exercise hard power. But such behavior is the exception, not the rule. As Elizabeth Pond argues, German interests are advanced not in balance-of-power clashes but in "tedious bureaucratic maneuvering in the confederation-plus of the EU and the confederation-minus of the transatlantic community."4 Hence, what is distinctive about Germany is not its unintentional power, which, like all larger states, it possesses in good measure, but the fact that its political leaders exercise power only in multilateral, institutionally mediated systems (the EU, the Atlantic community, and broader international fora) that soften sovereign power.

**Symbols of the New Europe**

In the fall of 1989, leading politicians such as Helmut Kohl, Oskar Lafontaine, Hans-Dietrich

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Genscher, Mikhail Gorbachev, Francois Mitterrand, and James Baker tried to articulate new concepts—such as "unification through association" and a "common European home"—with which to describe the new political reality. Willy Brandt, Margaret Thatcher, and Henry Kissinger captured the changes with the more familiar political terminology of national unification and national power. Both sets of voices describe important aspects of reality. National power and state interests have not become irrelevant in Europe's new political context. But the Europeanization of that context has itself become important for how states like Germany conceive of their national interests and for how they pursue their political strategies. In a time of revolutionary change, the extension of a partly internationalized German state was in many German and European quarters accepted as a natural response.

In Germany, Europe, and more generally, state identities are primarily external; they describe the actions of governments in a society of states. National identities are internal; they describe the processes by which mass publics acquire, modify, and forget their collective identities. While national identities in Europe have probably not decreased recently, to date they have not posed an insurmountable barrier to European integration. The permissive consensus on European integration among national mass publics has been reinforced by the gradual growth of ambiguous and contested collective European identities that are beginning to complement national identities among some social strata. Cultural policy, language use, currency, citizenship, and anthems are ambiguous symbols of collective identity that mirror in the social sphere the intermingling of a "multiperspectival" polity with "multiterried" governance systems through which traditional state identities have been partly internationalized.

The institutional presence of Europe as a set of norms and a source of collective identity has been the subject of explicit political considerations. The Adonnino Committee, for example, debated a Europe more accessible to its citizens and in 1985 recommended, among other things, the extension of student exchanges and an all-Europe television channel. The Franco-German bicultural "arte" television channel, with an estimated budget of $150 million, has been broadcasting since 1991. Student exchanges have blossomed. Between 1995 and 1999 the EU is planning to spend about $2.5 billion on all types of educational programs. Student applications for the largest of these programs increased from 3,000 in 1987 and 1988 to 146,000 in 1994 and 1995.

In terms of language, however, Europe is not moving toward one standard, as Spain and France did in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. English is the lingua franca, state languages tenaciously defend their position in the educational systems of the EU members, and regional languages have made successful incursions into national language regimes. A European living in southern England will be able to function effectively with one language; other Europeans will need command of their mother tongue and English; Europeans living in regions with their own distinctive languages, such as Catalonia or Scotland, will speak three languages. Europeans are institutionalizing a stable multiple language regime that they accept as natural and normal. But this regime is inefficient. States will retain separate state languages in a European and global language regime increasingly centered on English.

Much debated in the 1990s, the EMU also has an important symbolic dimension that touches Europe deeply. As with language, the outcome points to multiple collective identities. With German national identity closely linked to the deutsche mark, as is implied in the concept of mark-nationalism, the choice of a name and the look of a future European currency remained contested until late 1995. While the French favored sticking to the French-sounding ecu (identical in sound but not in orthography to the ECU, the European Currency Unit) that had been used in France several centuries earlier, Chancellor Kohl objected because this currency sounded in plain German too much like "cow" (or Kuh). For a while there was talk of calling the new currency the euro-franken or euro-franc, a concession to France and psychologically associated with a stable currency derived from both German history and present Swiss practice. Britain, however, vetoed the idea, dubbing the franken a "Frankenstein."

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3See David Laitin, "The Cultural Identities of a European State" (paper prepared for a conference on "European Identity and Its Intellectual Roots," Harvard University, May 1993, revised July 22, 1994).
The December 1993 EU summit meeting in Madrid agreed on a new name: the “euro.” The look of the currency remains to be decided. The choice of euro leaves open the possibility of a hyphenated European-national currency, as in euro-pound, euro-franc, or euro-deutsche mark, and a design that will somehow integrate the blue colors of the European flag. The subdivision of the euro into cents foreshadows such a solution. Countries adopting the common currency will be permitted to put their own designs on one side of the coins. Such a combination of European and national symbols would be compelling not only for a transitional period but as a long-term solution for a polity in which citizens may retain some aspects of their national currencies in a future EMU. New automobile license plates in Europe are a daily reminder of what a euro coin might look like; national plates are now adorned with a blue strip on the left-hand side showing the European emblem, 12 golden stars against a blue background, and the national origin of the car.

The new EU passport, issued by all countries in identical format and red color but embossed with the names of the different member states, is another example of this practice. Arriving at European airports and forming longer and slower queues, travelers who are not citizens of an EU member state quickly notice that European citizenship is becoming a reality, however slowly, even though the Europeanization of border controls remains one of the most controversial aspects of the integration process in the 1990s. Social and economic rights that were once restricted to national citizens are gradually being extended to immigrants. And a European citizenship that is partly distinct from national citizenship has become a distinct possibility.

The adoption of the “Ode to Joy” from Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony as Europe’s anthem points in the same direction. A well-known publicist for European unity in the interwar period, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, had suggested the “Ode to Joy” as a possible anthem as early as 1949. Between 1952 and 1964, East and West Germany used the ode as their joint victory hymn at the Olympic Games. Overcoming a number of potential rivals, the ode gradually established itself as the most widely accepted European hymn, especially in local communities. Building on many unsolicited private suggestions, the Council of Europe made its first official plea for a European anthem in June 1971. The 1971 resolution recommended the tune of the “Ode to Joy,” without the words, as Europe’s anthem. The famous conductor Herbert von Karajan was commissioned to make the musical arrangements, which he provided in 1972 for orchestra and brass.

In 1986 the European Parliament took “formal note of the current practice concerning the European anthem” in the hope that it and other symbols would “strengthen the concept of European identity.” Although the issue of language was not explicitly debated, the tune was condemned to be left without words, not so much because of the global rather than regional appeal of Schiller’s verses but because of the simple, widely understood, and unchallenged fact that this was a German-language text. Reflecting on the ambiguities surrounding the adoption of this anthem, Caryl Clark concludes, “[H]ere was truly a bastard-child of the Enlightenment: a song without words; hope without a text. . . . At a basic level the Council of Europe acted out of ignorance, was seduced by commercialism, fell prey to an ideology which espoused the superiority of German music, and (unwittingly or not) succumbed to the powerful force exerted by the Beethoven myth itself.”

The wordlessness of the European anthem speaks volumes about the ambiguities created by the admixture of regional, national, European, and international elements that constitutes an evolving collective European identity. The weakness of pan-European media, multinational public discourse, and the European Parliament points to the fact that the European polity is not a democratic state-in-becoming that currently suffers from a democratic deficit. Its system of multilevel governance reflects primarily a transnational growth of public and private bureaucracies. This constrains the growth of a European collective identity and guarantees the persistence of strong national and subnational identities in an integrating Europe. Europe’s collective identity has been carried by a permissive consensus among mass publics and by a strong commitment of political and social elites. Just as Beethoven continued to rework the ending to his Ninth, so too are European states continuously reworking a collective identity that now contains more international elements, in particular in Germany, than it has at any time in this century.

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6This discussion follows Caryl Clark, “Confronting the Ninth: Beethoven’s ‘Ode’ as European Anthem,” ms., Music Department, University of Toronto.

7Clark, op. cit., pp. 13, 15.
GERMAN IDENTITY TODAY

Symbols of collective identity contain a mixture of national and international elements. In Britain and France traditional national and state identities are much stronger than in Germany, where collective identities have changed many times. In the decade preceding unification, for example, the Federal Republic was already commonly equated with Germany. German receptivity to ambiguous identities that incorporate new, internationalized forms is arguably greater than that of the British or the French. Klaus Goetz argues that "the Europeanisation of the German state makes the search for the national, as opposed to the European interest, a fruitless task. The national and the European interest have become fused to a degree which makes their separate consideration increasingly impossible." The fact that Germany's Europeanization serves Germany's broad interests reinforces the important point that, far from undermining national interests, institutions are of critical importance in helping shape the conceptions of interests that inform policy in Germany and elsewhere.

Between 1949 and 1990, Germany's division and European integration were closely connected in a cold war setting. Within the context of the United States security guarantee for West Berlin, the Federal Republic, and Europe, West Germany's integration into Europe was, in Germany and in Europe, a calculated reaction to the disastrous consequences of Germany's bid for European and global supremacy in the first half of the twentieth century. The gradual fading of these memories and the sudden end of the cold war posed once again the issue of how a united Germany should relate to Europe. The answer, before and after 1989, was the same: through European integration.

Institutional politics in the EU mediates German power.Rare in contemporary Europe is what Simon Bulmer calls "deliberative" power, a direct international projection of German interest and power, as, for example, in the rules for the European Central Bank. The Bundesbank's high interest rate policy soon after unification was instead an instance of "unintentional power" that had strong effects on Germany's neighbors. The economic consequences of German unification thus illustrate how Germany exercises power not so much strategically as by its sheer weight. Finally, what matters most often is Germany's "indirect institutional" power. In shaping the rules of the game Germany tends to mobilize a bias favoring its policy in the long term. Indirect power eventually translates into regulative power.

Indirect institutional effects derive partly from similarities. For example, multilayered governance arrangements are typical of the EU and Germany. To be sure, the European version of "cooperative federalism" resembles Germany's only superficially.

The EU lacks an accretion of power at the top; the importance of legal institutions in the EU is due to the weakness, not the strength, of the state administration; the EU commands only a small fraction of the financial resources that are at the disposal of the German government; and the EU Commission does not have access to a field system of administration. More important, enveloped by strong legal institutions, both the EU and Germany have multi-tiered governance arrangements that institutionalize consultative bargaining and consensual decision-making procedures between different centers that are jointly involved in deliberation, decision making, and implementation.

It is noteworthy, Jeffrey Anderson has argued, that German political elites embraced the European Community initially as a means of reestablishing Germany's national sovereignty. Subsequently, Germany used its sovereign power to project onto its European partners a markedly different, internationalized state identity. The signing of the Maastricht treaty, however, may have been a high point of Germany's internationalization. This is illustrated by the increasing importance of the Länder for some policy issues and by the limits that the German Constitutional Court's 1993 judgment imposed on possible future constitutional reforms of the EU.

Since the mid-1960s, Germany's internationalist orientation has been reflected in its consistently strong support for successive enlargements of the

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard were still divided over the benefits of a “smaller” Europe, integrated around Germany and France, and a “larger” Europe more loosely structured to include Britain and most of the other European Free Trade Association members. But since then Germany has been a strong supporter of enlargement: British, Danish, and Irish accession in the 1970s; Spain, Portugal, and Greece in the 1980s; and the proposed eastern enlargement of the EU by the end of the 1990s. Put differently, in line with the internationalization of the identity of the German state after World War II, Germany’s approach to European institutions since the 1960s has been based on a broad definition of European identity.

Unification has had noticeable effects on Germany’s European policy. Underneath the “soft” power of institutional politics, newer, “hard” economic interests in the area of regulative politics express serious internal resource scarcities. These interests are beginning to supplant older, “hard” political interests that had aimed at the general stabilization of Germany’s external environment.

Jeffrey Anderson notes that since 1992, the German government has tended to look much more closely at the bottom line, paying more attention to who gets what. This is not surprising. Germany is the largest net contributor to the EU budget, both in absolute and in per capita terms. While unification has made Germany drop from second to seventh in per capita income among EU members, its net contribution has increased from $6.3 billion in 1987 to $13.2 billion in 1992. It is estimated that it will rise to $18 billion by 1997. In 1993 and 1994, a German household with four members paid about $1,200 annually for the EU, more than the special solidarity tax levied after unification. By 1996 the leaders of all the major parties in Germany agreed that Germany’s financial contribution to the EU amounted to about two-thirds of the EU’s net income, while the German GDP made up only one-third of EU countries’ total GDP; Germany’s annual excess payment of about $9 billion, they said, would have to stop.

This shift reflects new conditions at home and abroad and increases the weight of short-term interests in German policy. The issue that is likely to reflect this new condition most clearly is the eastern enlargement of the EU. Germany favors enlargement more strongly than any of the other main EU powers. But for enlargement to work, the EU and Germany will have to allocate additional funds. Considering Germany’s budgetary and economic difficulties after unification, playing the role of Europe’s paymaster will become increasingly difficult. Enlarging Europe to the east and paying off the southern European countries, which worry over a shift in the EU’s funding priorities, will seriously test established patterns of conducting political business in Europe. German budgetary conditions thus are likely to dictate the pace and direction of Europe’s future enlargement. This change in Germany’s traditional stance will rob the European polity of a traditional shock absorber.

The Europeanization of Germany during the last 40 years has been furthered greatly by a transformation of the country’s nationalist and neo-Nazi right. The dynamics of party competition in the Federal Republic, reinforced by the electoral strategy of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Socialist Union, led in the 1950s to the gradual absorption of a traditional nationalist protest vote by refugees and former Nazis into a staunchly anti-Communist conservative camp that favored European integration. The revival of a neo-Nazi right in the mid-1960s was no more than a brief interlude. The alarming increase in the 1990s of neo-Nazi social movements, such as the skinheads, with their xenophobic and racist violence has had little resonance among the established political parties and major institutions in society. After Chancellor Kohl reacted to these attacks with a thunderous silence, they were countered by a largely spontaneous social movement and an eventual crackdown by the Länder governments.

Finally, it is a happy accident of German history that the party of postcommunism, the Party of Democratic Socialism, absorbs in the five new German states not only the votes of old Communists but also most of those who normally would vote for a protest party on the right. Thus, despite extraordinarily high unemployment rates and totally disorienting changes, a nationalist right has been unable to attract sizable popular support in the new eastern states of the Federal Republic. History, institutions, strategy, and luck have left Germany with an extreme right that is weak, if measured by the standards of other European states such as France, Belgium, and Italy. This has enhanced the trust of other European states in German politics and policies. And it has created space for an expansion of the international elements that have gradually become part of the identity of the German state. Hence, developments inside Germany and in
Europe have run parallel, not just in terms of government policy and market transactions, but also in terms of identity and political interests.

**Germany’s Niche**

"Europe" stands not only for the institutionalization of human and democratic rights, but also for a substantive commitment to human welfare in capitalist markets. For this the Germans have coined the term "social market economy."

Nowhere has the power of this European identity been more evident than in Germany. The unification process illustrated that collective assertion had given way to individual entitlement. Sensing this momentous change, Chancellor Kohl did not promise Germans what the Bundesbank experts were telling him to expect: blood, sweat, and tears. Instead, he promised German voters business as usual: national unification without individual sacrifice. Combined with a firmly anchored welfare state identity, this nationalism of individual entitlement typifies not only Germany but all Western European states.

The process of a Europeanization of state identity has been considerably weaker in France and Britain than in Germany. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s persistent public opposition and President Mitterrand’s wavering covert opposition to German unification in 1989 are a reflection of this important fact. But it was France, not Germany or the smaller European democracies, that had accelerated the European integration process in the 1980s. Once it recognized that national strategies were becoming too costly, France turned toward Europe as the most promising way to defend a redefined, more international identity. Put bluntly, France became prepared to sacrifice a measure of control in Paris in expectation of gaining new instruments of control in Brussels. France thus has begun to follow Germany’s postwar foreign policy strategy: seeking to regain national sovereignty through international integration. The end of the cold war and German unification reinforced Germany’s traditional and France’s newly found stance. Hence the Single European Act, the Maastricht treaty, and moves toward the creation of EMU were carried by a strong French-German consensus on the advantages that derive from a more international definition of state identities and interests.

In contrast to France, Britain’s relationship to Europe has been more distant. Britain’s traditional identity as a global power and a victor in World War II has made it harder to accept descent to the position of an important medium-sized state in Europe. Britain’s special partnership with the United States retains a strong hold over British policy, reflected in adamant opposition to a common EU security and foreign policy. The Europeanization of British identity is also undercut by the traditional British role of playing one European state off against another from a position of splendid isolation. And British politicians are deeply committed to maintaining national sovereignty and protecting Parliament’s role as the guarantor of British democracy. Furthermore, many of Britain’s economic interests remain global (direct foreign investment and financial services), are totally separate from the EU (oil, which the EU imports and Britain exports), or are a source of profound financial and political irritation (agriculture). For many reasons Britain’s relationship to Europe has remained awkward. In short, France has sought to strengthen existing state identities within a supranational framework. The United Kingdom’s half-hearted commitment to Europe stems from the fact that Europe substitutes for the diminution of a global rather than the enhancement of a national role.

By contrast, Germany and some of the smaller European states have embraced Europe as a means of strengthening and projecting existing state identities. “[F]or many states,” Brigid Laffan argues, “there has been a high degree of compatibility between the national project and European integration.”

This difference in orientation is reflected in and reinforced by an internationalization of Germany’s position in European and Atlantic institutions that is more far-reaching than France’s or Britain’s. France has become a strong supporter of European integration while taking a cautious attitude toward NATO and the role of the United States in European defense matters. Britain is deeply divided over the issue of European integration but remains an avid supporter of NATO. In contrast to Britain and France, Germany’s position has been to further political integration in Europe, specifically by enhancing the power of the European Parliament and extending the principle of qualified majority voting. And Germany has not lacked fervor for NATO. As Ronald Asmus noted in the April 22, 1996, *International Herald Tribune*, the first post–cold war survey of the German elite showed that “today’s German leaders are overwhelmingly

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pro-European Union and pro-NATO, strongly favor enlargement to Eastern Europe, are sober about Russia’s future, and are increasingly willing to deploy the German army under a NATO flag in ‘out of area’ missions to defend common Western interests.”

German political controversies concern which international context to choose: the United Nations for peacekeeping operations, as the center-left prefers, or NATO for peace enforcement, as the center-right advocates. That the context for military action must be international is, however, beyond dispute in Germany. This is true neither of the unabashedly realist approach with which Britain seeks to defend its national sovereignty against an encroaching EU nor of the instrumental-institutionalist one with which France seeks to defend national interests with supranational instruments. Only Germany is a strong supporter of both the EU and NATO and appears ready to push ahead with a deepening institutionalization of Europe. Germany, writes Elizabeth Pond, “is thoroughly European in a way that none of its allies yet is. Germany is increasingly comfortable with its role as a medium-sized power. It no longer aspires either to be a big, cuddly Switzerland abstaining from Europe, or [to gain] more global reach. It has found its niche.”

**GERMANY INTERNATIONALIZED**

Our initial question—will Germany dominate Europe or Europe Germany?—does not point simply to converging or crosscutting political processes that one can analyze solely in terms of material or bargaining power. The domination of one state by another and the coordination of conflicting objectives of different governments occur frequently in the European polity. But these interactions acquire different meanings in different historical and institutional contexts. And those contexts have changed greatly since 1945 as the identity of the German state has been internationalized.

Analyses that focus on the importance of material or bargaining power fail to recognize how institutions have softened the effects of German power in Europe. In brief, we need to think not of Germany and Europe but of Germany in Europe. Since the European polity offers a familiar political stage, it is highly improbable that German political elites will any time soon turn their backs on European institutions that have served so well the interests that motivate German policies at home and abroad. Germany in Europe is a political fact that will continue to define the international and national politics of the new Europe.

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12 Pond, op. cit., p. 38.