Throughout the 1990s the conventional wisdom of international relations scholarship in the United States held that with the end of the Cold War and an intensification of institutionalized cooperation in Europe, Asia was ready to explode into violent conflicts. Large-scale war and conflicts were thought to be increasingly likely as an unpredictable North Korean government was teetering at the edge of an economic abyss on a divided Korean Peninsula; as an ascendant China was facing political succession in the midst of an enormous domestic transformation; as a more self-confident and nationalist Japan was bent on greater self-assertion in a time of increasing financial weakness; and as Southeast Asia remained deeply unsettled in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, with its largest country, a newly democratizing Indonesia, left in limbo following the debacle of East Timor and the fall of Suharto. None of these political constellations appeared to bode well for an era of peace and stable cooperation. Facing perhaps the most significant problems of any world region in adjusting to the post–Cold War era, Asia appeared to be “ripe for rivalry” (Bracken 1999; Betts 1993/94; Friedberg 1993/94).

The policies of the George W. Bush administration tend to confirm this view. Carefully nurtured throughout the 1990s, the policy of engaging North Korea, for example, was put on ice after the November 2000 presidential election. Political relations with China worsened during the early months of the Bush presidency. Since

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September 11 the war on terrorism has further strengthened the Bush administration’s perception of Asia as a volatile region in which a U.S. presence is necessary to prevent conflict. The war has deepened greatly U.S. involvement in Central Asia; produced a growing military presence in Southeast Asia, particularly the Philippines, which had previously drawn little attention from the United States; and helped improve U.S. relations with China while worsening those with North Korea.

Tensions on the Korean Peninsula and over the Taiwan Strait and the war on terrorism notwithstanding, during much of the 1990s large-scale war was more evident in “peaceful” Europe than among Asian “rivals.” More recently, it is in Europe that we witnessed the most vigorous challenges to the Bush administration’s war in Iraq, raising new questions about the future coherence of NATO and transatlantic relations; by contrast, key Asian powers reacted with either official support for the United States (Japan and South Korea) or remarkable restraint (China and India). And North Korea’s decision to restart its nuclear weapons program has so far been met by countries in the region with calls for dialogue rather than military intervention. This undercuts the conventional wisdom about Asian security and suggests that an alternative perspective deserves serious examination (Alagappa 2003a; Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003). Such a perspective takes a much broader view of what is meant by the term “security.” Instead of referring to military security narrowly construed, it considers also the economic and social dimensions of security. Specifically, this perspective focuses on the regionwide consensus on the primacy of economic growth and its interconnectedness with social stability, societal security, and regional peace and stability. Spearheaded by Japan and the original six members of ASEAN, this view has spread, most importantly, to China and Vietnam and, hopefully, with a helping U.S. hand, also to the Korean Peninsula. Previously dismissed by U.S. security specialists as abstruse scholarly rumination with no relationship to the tough problems of Asian security, these broader, multidimensional views on Asian security have taken center stage since September 11, thus giving the alternative perspective a credibility it sorely lacked before.

The arguments marshaled in support of this view differ, however. Some tend to credit the dominant role of the United States in world politics and in Asia as the advantages of engagement are increasingly viewed as outweighing the advantages of balancing (Kapstein 1999). Others see that dominance, especially in the unfolding war on terror, as a possible source of instability and the intensification of conflict as U.S. policy and Al Qaeda are offering global frames for local grievances and conflicts (Gershman 2002; Hedman 2002). Still others have suggested that the historical experiences and normative discourses shaping states’ perceptions of their regional environment make the security problems in parts of Asia less serious than is conventionally assumed (Acharya 2001, 2000a; Kerr, Mack, and Evans 1995). In light of these fundamental differences in perspective and the data to which they point, whether Asia is “ripe for rivalry” or “plump for peace” remains an open question.
Political reality we surmise is more complex than any of these perspectives allows for. This is unavoidable for the simple reason that in different parts of Asia-Pacific we find actors embracing quite different definitions of security. In Tokyo that definition tends to be broad and encompasses not only the deployment of troops in battle, unimaginable at least for the time being, but also the giving of economic aid, something that Japan does a lot of. In Washington, that definition tends to be narrowly focused on the military, which is large and powerful and dwarfs those of the rest of the world, and excludes economic aid, where the United States is exceptionally niggardly even after the promise of a doubling of the aid budget by President Bush in 2002. And in Beijing, narrow and broad conceptions of regional security remain deeply contested.

Beyond the varied security conceptions that actors hold, there are the varied lenses through which scholars analyze security. Different analytic lenses require different kinds of simplifications in how questions are posed, facts assembled, and explanations developed. Such differences, in turn, are shaped greatly by factors largely unrelated to issues of Asian security: metatheoretical considerations that define appropriate domains of inquiry, acceptable methods of analysis, and agreed-upon standards of evaluation. Although debates over such problems continue to shape research in other fields of political science and indeed the social sciences writ large (Hall 2003; Lichbach 2003; Shapiro 2002), the field of international relations in the United States has been especially affected by long-standing programmatic debates that divide “paradigms” or “research traditions” from one another. In the effort to make sense of the world, such paradigms or traditions invoke a particular vocabulary, adhere to a specific philosophical perspective, adopt a specific analytic framework, and develop a particular style of research. In noting fundamental incompatibilities between realist and Marxist theoretical perspectives, for example, Tony Smith (1994: 350) observes that “each paradigm is monotheistic, home to a jealous god.” These different research traditions have become central to how we identify ourselves and others as scholars and how we train the next generation of scholars. And they provide an enduring foundation for widely noted basic debates in the study of international affairs.

The growing interest in the existence of, and competition between, contending research traditions has not been without benefits. Indeed, one premier journal, *International Security*, has made a truly exceptional effort to present all sides of the debates, with extensive commentaries promoting or critiquing such research traditions as realism, rationalism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism. Similar inter-paradigm debates are also appearing regularly in European journals, although the tone, depth of philosophical grounding, and prevalent conceptions of world politics tend to be quite different than what one finds in the United States (Wæver 1999). This widespread attention to competing research traditions has marked international relations as a diverse field of scholarship and has contributed to increasingly nuanced articulations of theories and hypotheses within traditions. This is the sort of progress
that some cite in advocating scholarship bounded within discrete research traditions (Sanderson 1987) as these contend with “the models and foils” put forward by competing traditions (Lichbach 2003: 214). This does not, however, mean that international relations research has embraced the spirit of intellectual pluralism or generated better solutions to existing problems. This is because paradigm-bound research can get in the way of better understanding as it tends to ignore insights and problems that are not readily translated into a particular theoretical language (Hirschman 1970). At the cost of sacrificing the complexity that policy makers and other actors encounter in the real world, problems are frequently sliced into narrow puzzles to suit the agenda of a given research tradition. As a result, whatever progress might be claimed by proponents of particular research traditions, there is little consensus on what progress, if any, has been achieved by the field as a whole.

The recognition of the existence of, and possible complementarities between, multiple research traditions holds forth the prospect of translating the analytic languages and theoretical insights of each in the process of improving transparadigmatic knowledge on specific substantive problems. For example, seemingly incompatible strands of liberal, constructivist, and realist thought offer different insights in different languages that can be cautiously translated and productively combined in problem-focused research. Scholars who champion the “triangulation” of methods as a promising avenue to more reliable knowledge (Jick 1979; Tarrow 1995) point the way to a different way of learning that transcends specific research traditions (Makinda 2000). Theoretical triangulation is certainly more complicated than methodological triangulation given the risk of intellectual incoherence across components of research traditions. Nevertheless, the risk is worth the potential payoffs of encouraging, in the interest of better understanding specific research problems, self-conscious efforts to selectively incorporate concepts and insights from varied research traditions.

A generation ago Anatol Rapoport (1960) pointed the way when he identified fights, games, and debates as three modal situations requiring a mixture of conflict and cooperation. Research traditions in international relations have tended to encourage conflict but have done little to foster cooperation. Fortunately, a number of international relations scholars are beginning to shun metatheoretical battles, preferring instead to turn their attention to the identification of politically important and analytically interesting problems that reflect the complexity of international life and require answers that no single research tradition is equipped to provide. In their synthetic treatment of different strands of institutional analysis, for example, John L. Campbell and Ove K. Pedersen (2001: 249) seek to “stimulate dialogue among paradigms in order to explore the possibilities for theoretical cross-fertilization, rapprochement, and integration.” Similarly, others have begun to transgress the boundaries between realism, liberalism, and constructivism for the purpose of developing more integrated perspectives on particular aspects of international politics (Hellman
et al. 2003). Some have been exploring the sources of “prudence” in world politics by explicitly seeking a “sociological synthesis of realism and liberalism” (Hall and Paul 1999), while others have implicitly crossed the boundaries between research traditions in exploring how aspects of political economy can produce tendencies toward both war and peace (Wolfson 1998) or how issues of status and recognition intersect with security concerns to drive weapons proliferation or military industrialization (Kinsella and Chima 2001; Eyre and Suchman 1996). These are just a few examples of works that have moved away from interparadigm “fights” in order to develop more eclectic perspectives.

This book is part of that intellectual movement. It has two purposes. First, it offers an overdue examination and partial reformulation of claims embedded in both pessimistic and optimistic perspectives on Asian regional security. Case studies examine important national security issues for key countries and regions in Asia: China, Japan, and Korea, as well as the Southeast Asian region. Our aim is to reformulate and deepen theoretical and practical insights into the security problems, arrangements, and strategies in Asia. Second, the volume seeks to illustrate the value of relying on multiple explanatory frameworks that are consciously eclectic in language and substance rather than being driven by the tenets guiding particular research traditions. Such frameworks are formulated on pragmatic assumptions that permit us to sidestep clashes between irreconcilable metatheoretical postulates, and to draw upon different research traditions and the concepts, observations, and methods they generate in relation to particular problems.

Although cast at different levels of abstraction, the book’s two objectives are related. Within a particular research tradition, substantive analysis provides a firm grasp of specific logics as they work themselves out in particular aspects of Asian security. It is, however, likely to come up short in generating deeper insights into the relationships among the many factors that bear on Asian states’ understandings of, and approaches to, the “security” of their region. That is not to say that everything matters, or that specific research traditions do not generate useful ideas. Borrowing from Albert Hirschman (1981), we only suggest that “trespassing” across the sharp boundaries separating different traditions allows for new combinations of problem recognition and explanations that may be less parsimonious but intellectually more interesting or policy relevant.

In this chapter we discuss, first, the pragmatic quality and problem-focused character of eclecticism in the study of international affairs. Next, we articulate the general problematique for research on Asian security that draws attention to multiple and intersecting processes that shape how Asian states understand and address their security concerns. Finally, we introduce and preview the substantive contributions that, read collectively, represent an effort to build eclectic explanatory sketches not easily subsumed within existing research traditions.

A Case for Analytical Eclecticism
Research Traditions and Explanatory Sketches in International Relations

Most scholars of international relations think of the theoretical universe as divided between different schools of thought to which scholars commit themselves in the belief that they generate better explanations with greater policy relevance. What ultimately distinguishes these schools, however, are not the substantive claims they produce but the underlying cognitive structures upon which these claims are formulated. These structures shape what phenomena are considered important and explainable, how research questions about such phenomena are posed, what concepts and methods are employed in generating explanations of the phenomena, and what standards are reasonable for evaluating these explanations. Such abstract specifications reflect enduring ontological and epistemological, that is metatheoretical, assumptions shared by members of some research communities but not others. Hence, as is true of the history of science and social science more generally, as a field of scholarship international relations is characterized by the emergence of, competition between, and evolution or degeneration of, discrete cognitive structures within which specific models and narratives are constructed, communicated, and evaluated.

Following Thomas Kuhn (1962), some scholars of international relations have referred to these structures as “paradigms.” Paradigms are concerted intellectual efforts to make sense of the world. When fully institutionalized, their weak links are no longer recognized, their foundational assumptions are no longer questioned, and their anomalies are consistently overlooked or considered beyond the purview of specific research questions. Dissatisfied with the monism implied in a Kuhnian vision of normal science, or perhaps frustrated by the absence of criteria for comparing supposedly incommensurable paradigms, some international relations scholars have employed Lakatos’s (1970) concept of “research programs” that are at least assumed to be comparable to each other in terms of how effectively the successive theories they produce deal with novel facts or anomalies over time. These scholars find Lakatosian research programs to be “intuitively appealing and attractive” (Elman and Elman 2003a, 2002: 253) in making sense of international relations scholarship because individual theories in the field have indeed come to be clustered around competing sets of “core” assumptions, and because debates among adherents of contending perspectives do frequently revolve around the question of whether one or the other perspective is “progressive” or “degenerative.”

Although Kuhn and Lakatos represent contending epistemological perspectives, both “paradigms” and “research programs” face limitations as units for organizing and assessing international relations research. The persistence of divisive debates among proponents of different approaches is difficult to square with the notion of either a single dominant paradigm or the staying power of any one research program relative to another. Furthermore, the overlapping of some assumptions across different ap-
proaches suggests that different schools of thought are not always mutually exclusive
cognitive structures that can be evaluated according to any one standard. More im-
portantly, although framed in different languages in different periods, the founda-
tional divides reflected in international relations debates—for example, objectivism
vs. subjectivism, agency vs. structure, material vs. ideal—represent recurrent rather
than episodic problems (Sil 2000: 9–12), suggesting that there is neither a clear se-
quence of normal and revolutionary science as Kuhn envisioned, nor any evidence
that progressive research programs will be recognized as such by any but their own
adherents. Indeed, even those who find Lakatosian research programs to be useful in
assessing scholarly research differ in terms of which elements of Lakatos’s metatheory
are given priority, with some emphasizing the significance of sophisticated falsifica-
tionism for the resilience of conflicting theories and others focusing on the criteria
for identifying progressive problem shifts (Elman and Elman 2003b). Andrew Mo-
ravcskik (2003), for example, relies on Lakatos to critique realism and advance the
case for liberalism as a progressive research program, but also warns that Lakatosian
thinking encourages a zero-sum competition among approaches and diverts atten-
tion from exploring the possibilities for synthesis. Even more problematic are some
characteristic, often unacknowledged, weaknesses within approaches identified as re-
search programs in international relations: proponents of research programs tend to
value substantive or heuristic novelty as a measure of their scientific progress, offer
multiple definitions of what constitutes novel facts, engage in misstatements and
tenacious battles that undercut tolerance and the acknowledgment of programmatic
failures, and provide insufficient information to allow us to distinguish consistently
between different research programs or to assign proper weights to a program’s “hard
core,” “positive heuristic,” or “protective belt” (Elman and Elman 2002: 245–52).

Because of the limitations that attend the concepts of “paradigm” or “research
program,” we follow here Larry Laudan’s (1996, 1990, 1984, 1977) more flexible no-
tion of competing and evolving “research traditions.” This concept captures how
scholars opt to identify, pose, and resolve problems in international relations research,
including the vexing issues of Asian security addressed in this volume. Like Kuhnian
paradigms and Lakatosian research programs, Laudan’s conception of research tradi-
tions suggests long-enduring commitments that motivate and distinguish clusters of
scientific research. Typically such traditions consist of two things: “(1) a set of beliefs
about what sorts of entities and processes make up the domain of inquiry; and (2) a
set of epistemic and methodological norms about how the domain is to be investi-
gated, how theories are to be tested, how data are to be collected, and the like” (Lau-
dan 1996: 83). Unlike Kuhn and Lakatos, however, Laudan offers no single model of
how disciplines as a whole evolve or of how to measure their progress. He argues in-
stead that we should focus on different research traditions as intrinsically diverse clus-
ters of scholarship that can engender diverse theories, some more useful than others
in solving particular problems. Moreover, unlike Kuhn and Lakatos, Laudan sees re-
search traditions as potentially capable of encompassing very different types of research products involving different, at times even contradictory, explanatory propositions. This allows for the possibility that propositions drawn from different research traditions complement one another in the solution of common empirical problems, in spite of the foundational divides associated with these traditions. Since in the social sciences not all components of competing schools of thought represent elements of mutually exclusive cognitive structures and since these competing schools differ over time in their defining features and their core points of contention, it makes more sense to speak of the field in terms of more fluid research traditions rather than more rigidly defined paradigms or research programs. We address the merits and limits of Laudan’s reliance on “problem-solving” below, but for now we turn to the main research traditions in international relations, particularly as the field has evolved in the United States.

Although preferred labels and particular bones of contention have varied, since its inception in the early twentieth century the field of international relations has been divided by a long list of competing “isms” that may be viewed as competing research traditions. Enduring debates have existed among proponents of realism and idealism, behaviorism and traditionalism, neoliberalism and neorealism, rationalism and constructivism, and a variety of different structuralisms and poststructuralisms. In some cases, debate has revolved primarily around substantive interpretations or normative orientations; in others, around ontological or epistemological issues. Among research communities within the United States, rationalism, in both its realist and liberal variants, set the terms of scholarly debate early on. Elsewhere, the importance of ideas and identities have long been taken for granted and debates over world politics have revolved around competing understandings of the nature of “ideas” and “identity.” There are then many ways of framing competing approaches to international relations. For the purpose of defining and promoting eclectic approaches to Asian security, we rely here on the familiar triad of constructivism, liberalism, and realism as a usefully simplified way to address some foundational, conceptual, methodological, and substantive debates in contemporary international relations research. There exist variations within and across these three approaches, for example, in the extent to which a particular argument is founded on positivist assumptions or specific methodological injunctions. Nevertheless, for the limited purpose of defining and distinguishing eclectic analytic perspectives, these labels capture meaningful differences in the way scholars identify themselves and in the cognitive structures that shape how they recognize, pose, and approach the problems they seek to solve. Thus we could view constructivism, liberalism, and realism as three sides of a triangle that take for granted the centrality of some core assumptions of international life, for example, in their respective focus on identity, efficiency, and power (see Figure 1.1). At the same time, however, some variants of these traditions converge (at the triangle’s corners) with one or the other research tradition’s ontology, epistemology, methodology, or
normative orientations. The field of international relations thus encompasses both the practices of normal science working around shared core assumptions as well as the possibility of eclectic theorizing.

Constructivism is based on the fundamental view that ideational structures mediate how actors perceive, construct, and reproduce the institutional and material structures they inhabit as well as their own roles and identities within them. Constructivism thus highlights the significance of transformative or generative processes such as deliberation, persuasion, and socialization that, for better or worse, can lead to the transformation of identities and preferences (Johnston 2001; Wendt 1999; Finnemore 1996). Assigning epistemological significance to such processes at the individual level requires “a conception of actors who are not only strategically but also discursively competent” (Ruggie 1998: 21), something that is precluded by the utilitarian assumptions held by most liberals and realists. In constructivist analyses of state behavior and the relations between states, ideational factors and processes are expected to be important for tracing whether collective actors are likely to construct or diffuse enmity or amity between self and other. And constructivist analyses pay attention to the reproduction and transformation of collective identities as they affect the prospects for social learning and also the diffusion of collective norms and individual beliefs. Constructivists do, however, exhibit important differences in their foundational assumptions: Some identify with a “naturalist” form of positivism predicated on a realist ontology (Dessler 1999; Wendt 1995), whereas others depart from a “pragmatist” conception of social knowledge (Haas and Haas 2002), and still others adopt a hermeneutic approach consistent with the relativistic epistemology of postmodernism (Walker 2000; Ashley 1995). The first two strands are more likely than the third to share some set of epistemological assumptions that overlap with those held by most realists or liberals (near corners A and B in Figure 1.1). The “soft rationalism” embraced by pragmatist constructivists is particularly conducive to engaging realist and liberal arguments over the character and formation of actors’ material and ideal interests (Haas 2001). These differences suggest that constructivist research is rendered coherent and distinctive not by a comprehensive epistemological perspective or a unique normative orientation but rather by the ontological assumption of...
the social construction of world politics that requires endogenizing actors’ identities and treating interests as variable and thus responsive to such ideational processes as social learning, norm diffusion, and socialization.

Contemporary liberalism in its various formulations focuses largely on how rational state actors seek to maximize efficiency in an interdependent world and how, even under conditions of anarchy, this intentionality can produce cooperative arrangements and a rational aggregation of social preferences. Because of their willingness to consider the independent effects of the environments in which actors operate, some versions of liberalism can converge with some types of constructivism (around the triangle’s corner B) on the significance of ideas, values, and multilateral institutions in constraining actors and reshaping their preferences (Haas 2001). Moreover, many constructivists share with classical formulations of liberalism (near corner B) a normative concern for progress predicated on the idea that the relevant actors and their interests are not fixed but variable, embedded in a wider set of social relationships and amenable to the pressure of social norms and moral persuasion (Reus-Smit 2001). More concretely, both perspectives put much stock in the possibility that international organizations can engender shared values and reciprocal understandings that can sustain, even if they do not alter, actors’ identities and preferences, and cooperative arrangements beyond the level one would predict solely on the basis from the strategic calculation of member states. This idea is evident, for example, in arguments about the significance of shared democratic values for the persistence of the U.S.-Japan alliance (Mochizuki and O’Hanlon 1998: 127) and the importance of shared discourses about North Korea in explaining the longevity of the U.S.-Korea alliance (Suh, this volume).

At a more fundamental level, however, neoliberals are much closer to realists than constructivists in accepting utilitarian and rationalist assumptions in the identification of the relevant actors, interests, and structures in international politics (corner C). Thus, even when contemporary liberals take seriously the role of ideas and beliefs as focal points of common concern (Goldstein and Keohane 1993), they consider these as reflections of states’ experiences in the international arena or new instruments for realizing the benefits of cooperation over the longer term. They do not view ideas and beliefs as forces capable of fundamentally altering the identities or core interests of actors. What distinguishes liberals from realists is not their ontology or epistemology but their designation of the central problems that need to be investigated. This, in turn, reflects competing assumptions about the preference-ordering of states (whether they seek absolute gains or relative gains) and the causal impact of international institutions (whether, in the interest of all member states, they introduce a greater degree of predictability, transparency, and reciprocity). Liberals allow for a wider range of conditions under which absolute gains motivate cooperative state behavior, and assign greater importance to international institutions as a basis for sustaining that behavior and mitigating the effects of anarchy. Institutions may be significant for constructivists as well, but mainly as reflections of social practice or as
potential sources of unanticipated consequences and major shifts in actors’ identities and perceptions of interest. Specifically for neoliberals, institutions represent equilibrium outcomes of strategic interaction, reducing transaction costs, providing information, making commitments more credible, and encouraging reciprocity (Keohane and Martin 1995).

In its current formulation, realist theory is concerned about outcomes at the systemic level (usually stability or conflict among states) or, in recent neoclassical variants, in the effects of actor preferences on state behavior in different environments (Finel 2001/02). Outcomes are assumed to be driven primarily by asymmetrical distributions in capabilities, measured largely in military terms or material resources, that are required to defend one’s borders, inflict harm on other states, or prevail in domestic politics. Given the centrality and objective character of the material distribution of capabilities, realists diverge sharply from constructivism’s emphasis on ideational factors. At the same time, contra liberalism, realists insist that states are inescapably operating in a self-help system in which their cooperation is constrained by the objective of maximizing relative gains in the distribution of capabilities. On questions of security, the unmitigating logic of realpolitik is independently articulated by the behavior of states. Under most conditions, “institutions have minimal influence on state behavior and thus hold little prospect for promoting stability” (Mearsheimer 1994/95: 7).

This difference in problem focus and substantive interpretation does not keep realists from sharing with important strands of liberalism the view that a state’s interests, identities, and ability to identify opportunities and threats are all unproblematic. This similarity permits some convergence in substantive analysis (at corner C). This is evident, for example, in arguments about how the U.S. continued military and economic engagement in Asia serves the purpose of both guarding against potential regional hegemons and provides opportunities for increased cooperation and prosperity throughout the Asia-Pacific. By the same token, weak states participate actively in international institutions in the hope of diffusing security threats posed by stronger members of those institutions. This is one reason why ASEAN member states have sought wider fora, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), to engage Japan, China, and the two Koreas, and why multilateralism holds some promise in the attempt to resolve the conflict between the two Koreas (Khong 1997b; Kurata 1996). Furthermore, realist thought begins to converge with constructivist perspectives (at corner A) where realist behavior is viewed as a projection of particular ideas and beliefs held by state actors. This is evident, for example, in the “cultural realism” that drove Chinese grand strategy in various periods in Chinese history (Johnston 1995) and perhaps also in the symbolic significance of the Taiwan issue in the triangular relations between China, Japan, and the United States (Xu 2003; Christensen 1999).

This threefold characterization of contemporary international relations research is by no means the only way to classify research traditions. For example, the lack of deep epistemological disagreements between important variants of contemporary re-
alism and liberalism have prompted some recent surveys of the field to refer to these schools as competing sets of claims about actors’ preferences and behaviors within an overarching framework referred to variously as “rationalism” (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1999a) or “neo-utilitarianism” (Ruggie 1998). Alternatively, scholars may prefer to focus on analytic subdivisions that have emerged within research traditions. For example, those with intellectual sensibilities that are more “reflectivist” (Wæver 1996) than rationalist, may prefer to apply the threefold characterization to disagreements among “natural” constructivists, critical constructivists, and postmodernists. Thus, no single set of metatheoretical differences distinguishes discrete research traditions in international relations, and depending on the research community in question, the operative distinctions may range from deep differences over ontological issues (for example, in the debates between rationalist and constructivist conceptions of preferences) to differences over epistemological postures (for example, in the debates between classical and structural realists or between conventional and postmodern constructivists). What matters more is that the questions and practices of scholars lead them to identify with, promote, and communicate within separate groups—as has been the case with strands of realism and liberalism for over two decades and is now turning out to be the case for constructivism as well. So long as constructivists, liberals, and realists themselves see fit to distinguish themselves from one another, and so long as the distinction produces repeated clashes over which problems are important, which variables are assigned more causal weight, and which principles more consistently guide the preference-ordering and behavior of actors, there are sufficient grounds for treating them as competing research traditions.

Another potential problem is that the distinctions sometimes get blurred when scholars deploy the rhetorical strategy of identifying their preferred research tradition with the existence of a “reasonable mainstream” that supposedly enjoys almost universal assent, or of a “conventional wisdom” that supposedly improves on and subsumes various “minority” positions. Some realists, for example, claim that institutions only matter when they reinforce preexisting common interests and thus regard neoliberal institutionalism as simply realism by another name (Mearsheimer 1995). In response, neoliberals retort that neoliberal institutionalist theory is flexible enough to subsume the utilitarian and rationalist aspects of realism (Keohane and Martin 1995). A while back, in the late 1980s, both realists and liberals could argue with some justification that critics of the mainstream had failed to produce empirically grounded research to back up their abstract claims. Over the last decade, constructivists have responded to that charge. In doing so they have opened themselves up to the opposite criticism. Some critical theorists and postmodernists have chided constructivists for having been mainstreamed by positivism (Hopf 1998; Price and Reus-Smit 1998). Such rhetorical duels are quite typical of social science debates. They cannot conceal, however, fundamental differences in a priori assumptions that guide analyses in different research traditions. In fact, the existence of such rhetoric is itself indicative of
the vigor with which different research traditions attempt to establish dominance, with the paradoxical result that such efforts prevent the very monism implied by a dominant paradigm and contribute to intensified competition between the traditions (Sil 2000a).

Making the case for analytical eclecticism requires us to cut the link between research traditions and the substantive interpretations and empirical claims constructed within them. Research traditions cannot themselves be evaluated against each other. Their ontological and epistemological foundations are often too incommensurable and too abstract to produce specific methodological injunctions or substantive explanations and predictions. Nor can they be synthesized into a single unified model of scientific research. While the most doctrinaire proponents of any one research tradition will reject the need for synthesis, “even coalitions of the willing may find the going difficult as they discover the analytical boundaries beyond which their respective approaches cannot be pushed” (Ruggie 1998: 37). But what can be tested, compared, and partially recombined are the “explanatory sketches” research traditions generate. We employ this term to sidestep the ambiguity and contestation often generated by the use of such terms as theory or hypothesis, especially since these terms are often defined and qualified differently across competing research traditions. What passes for a “theory” is often little more than an empirical claim embedded in the metatheoretical structures associated with a particular school or approach. We define explanatory sketches broadly to refer to any interpretation of a set of observations that is intended to generate a causally significant understanding of specific empirical outcomes, whether these are specific historical events, patterns of similarity and dissimilarity in broad configurations, or variations across comparable events. As such, explanatory sketches are sufficiently open-ended to encompass a wide range of empirical claims. Such claims need not be limited to a single time- or space-bound context. And they should be formulated so as permit, at least in principle, some form of validation or falsification through some empirical observation. Thus, a realist explanation for the conflict on the Korean Peninsula, a narrative interpreting the sources and significance of Japan’s culture of security in the postwar international context, or a choice-based model of security cooperation in Southeast Asia during the 1990s can all be regarded as explanatory sketches. All three impute causal significance to certain facts in relation to certain outcomes. And all three draw upon logics that can be adapted to an analysis of comparable contexts.

The relationship between explanatory sketches and research traditions is the point of departure for analytical eclecticism. For the most part, an explanatory sketch is likely to be “nested” within one or another research tradition, accepting as unproblematic the ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions characteristic of that tradition. Conversely, research traditions are highly significant for the purpose of identifying and classifying explanatory sketches in a given field of research. They indicate which explanatory sketches accept certain assumptions as uncontrover-
sional background knowledge; which sketches conform to established conventions governing the collection of evidence and the testing of general statements; which sketches reinforce or undermine the intellectual coherence of a research tradition; which need to be altered because they introduce unanticipated problems; and which need to be excluded entirely from the tradition because of the insurmountable challenge they pose by violating foundational assumptions. Moreover, institutional factors—ranging from the venues for publication and funding patterns to faculty hiring and graduate training—strengthen the importance investigators themselves attach to presenting their projects and findings in the form of explanatory sketches that fit easily into a well-established research tradition. These factors account for why most research in international relations over the past century can be readily identified in terms of quite familiar labels such as realism, liberalism, behaviorism, or structuralism, each of which ultimately derives its coherence and significance from the kinds of beliefs and norms that Laudan identifies as the basis for a research tradition.

Although it is typically true that explanatory sketches are “nested” in particular research traditions, for two reasons this is not necessarily so. First, research traditions vary in terms of the significance they attribute to foundational assumptions, methodological orientations, and domains of inquiry. One research tradition may be identified primarily in terms of its ontological assumptions and theoretical language, allowing for a wide-ranging domain of inquiry and a large set of methodological tools. Another may be more recognizable through the application of common methodological tools to a well-specified domain of inquiry even if groups within that tradition differ on questions of epistemology. This is evident, for example, for much of constructivism, where we find empiricist and hermeneutic approaches both sharing the assumption of a socially constructed international world and both employing the language of “discourse” and “identity” in trying to offer insights about the world. Similarly, the underlying preference for methodological individualism is a central defining feature of neoliberal institutionalism, even though some of its adherents may be game theorists testing formal models and others empiricists in search of probabilistic hypotheses. Moreover, as research traditions suggest enduring commitments, it is also likely that they will have to evolve as particular assumptions or heuristic devices become more or less valuable or fashionable over time for different generations of scholars seeking to explain similar problems in new environments. While common foundational assumptions and methodological orientations are probably sufficient to produce similarities across explanatory sketches in adjacent generations of scholarship, as the number of generations increases, differences in the character of explanatory sketches may make them difficult to recognize as part of the same research tradition, as is true, for example of work on security communities (Adler and Barnett 1998; Deutsch et al. 1957).

Second, the considerable differences within constructivist, liberal, and realist research traditions that we mentioned above generate significantly different explanatory
sketches that can coexist as part of a single research tradition. Some may produce substantive claims that implicitly or explicitly challenge the “normal” expectations of their respective research traditions in spite of shared ontological and epistemological principles. And, explanatory sketches constructed within different research traditions can converge in their wider implications and projections, despite fundamental disagreements over foundational or methodological issues and the characterization of specific problems. Thus, realism, regarded by some as a source of pessimistic scenarios for Asia (Friedberg 1993/94), can also provide the basis for theories suggesting lasting stability through, for example, the logic of nuclear deterrence (Goldstein 2001a) or a regionally calibrated balance of power in which China’s military strength is offset by regional alliances and by the United States as an “offshore balancer” (Mearsheimer 2001: 234–66; Layne 1997). Similarly, regarded by some as inherently optimistic about the prospects for peaceful change through norm diffusion and social learning, constructivism can be adapted to emphasize how enduring beliefs about sovereignty or resilient images of enmity can hinder the resolution of volatile issues such as Taiwan (Johnston, this volume) or a divided Korea (Suh, this volume; Moon and Chun 2003; Grinker 1998). A neoliberal institutionalist sketch might interpret the growth of such institutions as the Asian Development Bank as evidence of increasing multilateralism across regions in an ever more interdependent world, converging with constructivist sketches emphasizing the strength of shared norms and the socialization of particular groups of states in overcoming historical enmities and nurturing regional alliances, for example in the case of Southeast Asia (Acharya 2001; Johnston 1999b; Khong 1997b); at the same time, another neoliberal sketch might view regional institutions as evidence of a more sophisticated strategy conceived by Asian states to promote their economic interests in world markets, converging with realists who view Asia primarily as an arena of competition and conflict in the absence of a bipolar international system. And, constructivist, neoliberal institutionalist, and neorealist treatments of state behavior may proceed from quite different assumptions and identify quite different causal mechanisms while still agreeing on how China is likely to respond to new regional economic institutions or how Japan’s changing role in such institutions indicates a reduced willingness to rely only on its bilateral relationship with the United States.

Research traditions are not rigid doctrines that produce uniform explanatory sketches employing similar logics. Explanatory sketches can be meaningfully grouped in terms of the implications of their substantive claims, in spite of significant differences in their philosophical or methodological foundations and their preferred causal mechanisms. It is thus possible to make adjustments to foundational or methodological principles to permit a more direct comparison, synthesis, or integration across explanatory sketches about similar phenomena even if these sketches are drawn from different traditions. This may pose problems for classifying all social science and international relations research in terms of distinct and competing research traditions (Ben-David 1978: 744–45). Yet it is precisely this flexibility in Laudan’s understanding
of research tradition that opens the door to thinking about the possibilities and merits of analytical eclecticism in relation to discrete problems in international relations.

Eclecticism and Problem Solving

Analytical eclecticism detaches explanatory sketches from the competing metatheoretical systems in which they are embedded. It offers us an opportunity to draw upon clusters of empirical observations, causal logics, and interpretations spanning different research traditions. It thus permits us to take advantage of complementarities in the problems we address and the empirical claims we make. Ronald Jepperson (1998) has already alerted us to the combinatorial potential arising from several different types of complementarity. Simple complementarity, he suggests, relies on the specialization of different perspectives in different empirical domains. Additive complementarity focuses on types of effects, now often called “mechanisms,” such as aggregation (choice theoretic), selection (population ecology), or social construction (institutionalism). Modular complementarity either utilizes different approaches at different “stages” of a process, or it nests arguments constructed at one level of analysis within more general arguments constructed at a different level of analysis. Finally, complementarity in problem recognition combines some sketch that isolates and describes phenomena with a newly acquired significance, with another sketch that may be adept at providing explanations for these phenomena even though it may not have recognized them in the first place.

Although specialists from competing research traditions do not view their relationship to one another in these terms, in scholarly practice simple complementarity is not unknown in international relations. Explicit acknowledgement of this fact might help in taking advantage of other forms of complementarity, for example in the definition of problems or in the development of explanatory sketches. Problem recognition complementarity, for example, can lead us to view systemic outcomes and state behavior as part and parcel of the same problem in Asian affairs; thus, China’s sensitivity on Taiwan, ASEAN members’ interest in a continued U.S. role, and Japan’s explorations in multilateralism could be viewed as interrelated trends tending toward regional stability or conflict. This could set the stage for explanatory sketches that rely on modular complementarity in complex explanatory sketches where, for example, a constructivist account of identity formation may establish variation in threat perception across states that can then be employed to understand variations in the enthusiasm with which states pursue absolute gains through open regional institutions or relative gains through strategic alliances intended to offset the capabilities of a stronger regional power (Rousseau 2002).

Analytical eclecticism does not privilege any one type of combinatorial formula or seek to build a unified theory encompassing each and every variable identified in competing research traditions. Eclecticism is distinguished simply by the articulation
of more complex problematiques that emphasize connections between outcomes stipulated in puzzles investigated in different research traditions, and by the construction of explanatory sketches that incorporate data, interpretations, and causal logics from at least two distinct traditions. That is, analytical eclecticism regards existing research traditions fluidly and is willing to borrow selectively from each to construct accounts that travel across the sides of the triangle representing constructivism, realism, and liberalism (Figure 1.2).

The basic logic of eclecticism is not limited to the triad of approaches we are discussing here. For example, in research communities outside the United States rationalist analysis has occupied a less central place in the study of international relations compared to identities and other ideational structures. There the plea for analytical eclecticism might be tilted more toward integrating empiricist perspectives on international politics with postmodernist theoretical stances and text-based styles of analysis typical of the humanities. Alternatively, in a wider arena of research, eclecticism may take the form of identifying ways to bridge the gulf between the social and natural sciences, as is evident in recent creative advances in neuroscience, evolutionary biology, and the study of complexity. The point is that eclecticism is a relative construct, significantly mainly as a strategy for coping with existing scholarly debate in a field in which competing perspectives may be reasonably identified as discrete research traditions. As an alternative to joining in such a debate on behalf of one or another perspective or dismissing it as proof of the fundamental incommensurability of theories, eclecticism explores new combinations of assumptions, concepts, interpretations, and methods embedded in explanatory sketches generated by competing research traditions.

The potential value of engaging in such combinatorial exercises may be understood by way of analogy to two stories about watchmaking that exhibit what Arthur Koestler dubbed “holonic principles of architecture,” the relation between the whole and its parts (Mathews 1996). For Herbert Simon (1981: 200–2) the social world consists of partly decomposable systems with tight causal linkages among specific sets of factors that, loosely linked to other clusters, form a weakly linked, broader ensemble. Simon tells a parable of two Swiss watchmakers that illustrates the advantage of eclec-
tic reasoning. Tempus built his watch from separate parts. When he was disturbed and had to put an unfinished watch down on the table, it came apart, and Tempus had to start all over again. He built few watches. Horus built his watches by assembling the individual pieces into modules that he subsequently integrated to make a watch. When he was disturbed he put down the module he was working on and thus lost less time and labor. He built many watches. A second story comes from the more recent history of watchmaking. Seiko’s watchmakers revolutionized miniaturization by splitting the motor into three components and inserting them into tiny spaces between the watch’s gears. Rather than thinking, as did the Swiss, of motor and gear as natural components that help in the production of the watch, Seiko engineers thought of the total product and the purpose and role of each component in relation to the whole (Mathews 1996: 27–28). Horus and Tempus, the Swiss and Seiko proceed quite differently; but, what made a difference in the productivity of Horus and Seiko was their recognition of the different ways the elements of a system could be assembled in different combinations of modules or subsystems. This, in turn, enabled them to ultimately solve problems that were not even recognized as such by Tempus or the Swiss.

Recognizing and solving problems, in fact, are at the heart of Laudan’s view of scientific progress. Solved problems constitute scientific progress; unsolved problems chart areas for future exploration; and anomalous problems are those that a competing explanatory sketch may be able to solve. Research traditions and explanatory sketches vary in the kinds of problems they identify, the efficacy with which they solve these problems, and the extent to which they avoid anomalies (Laudan 1996: 79–81). The rationality and cumulation of scientific process ultimately depend less on the evolution, coherence, and status of different research traditions and more on their contribution to “problem-solving progress” (Laudan 1977: 109).

In principle, all explanatory sketches and research traditions contribute to problem solving and all have the “capacity to enable new observations of the world and thus even to generate entire new descriptive phenomenologies” (Jeppeson 1998: 4). The quality of research still depends significantly on the kinds of information available and on the skills, intuition, and intellectual creativity of the researcher. Yet, in contemporary international relations scholarship constructivist, liberal, and realist explanatory sketches differ greatly in terms of the kinds of insights they offer. Some sketches get much more purchase for understanding individual choices at the micro level, others for illuminating processes at the macro level; some sketches can make us understand problems of strategic interactions among actors, others the processes by which the actors acquire and alter their identities; some sketches are well suited for contexts in which material capabilities are decisive for explaining outcomes, others in which individual beliefs are of central importance, still others in which collective norms are of primary causal or constitutive importance. These differences do not merely represent competing empirical claims. They reveal also differences in problem focus and in the capacity to solve particular kinds of problems. Relying on sketches
that draw on several research traditions, without being fully beholden to any one of
them, is a virtue not a vice of a problem-focused eclectic approach. Its virtue lies in
a pragmatism that avoids rigid commitments to working only within existing re-
search traditions. For example, an eclectic approach alerts us to the possibility that
balance of power arguments inspired by realist theory may have connections to se-
curity community arguments following a constructivist logic, enabling us to better
articulate and understand such problems as the evolution of international relations in
northern Europe (Katzenstein 1996b). For Laudan, as for Chairman Deng, combin-
ing research traditions is a pragmatic move: it makes no difference whether the cat is
black or white as long as it catches mice.

Attention to problem solving is necessary but not sufficient for progress in inter-
national relations research. As Laudan himself recognizes, problem and tradition are af-
ter all intertwined: by their very nature research traditions are likely to channel atten-
tion toward particular empirical issues that appear to be more readily problematized
using their preferred conceptual and methodological apparatus. Moreover, there is the
possibility that judgments about the problem-solving efficacy of specific research tra-
ditions may prompt some researchers to shift their tentative commitment prematurely
from one tradition to another, even though such judgments presume that it is the
same problem that is being explored in competing traditions and the same standard
that is being used in determining whether and how efficaciously the problem is
solved. How should we think about problems that exist apart from traditions and
sketches? How can we even communicate a problem in a language that will be intel-
ligible to more than one research tradition? What is the status of unsolved problems
that are potential rather than actual? And, how do we form a consensus about the
point at which a problem can be declared to have been solved? Realists, for example,
are not likely to concern themselves with such problems as the rules governing entry
into the WTO or the rate of diffusion of human rights norms across particular coun-
tries. Similarly, neither liberals nor constructivists are likely to expend much energy on
problems of deterrence failure or the relative utility of offensive/defensive balances.
Thus, claims that such problems have been solved are not likely to impress all students
of international affairs, whether these claims are from proponents of specific research
traditions or from scholars oriented toward eclecticism. In other words, research prob-
lems in international relations are not always like Chairman Deng’s mice; in some
cases, a cat may not even know that there is a mouse to be caught, and in other cases,
the white cat and black cat may have different rules for deciding if, when, and how
quickly a mouse has been caught.

Ultimately, then, the case for analytical eclecticism is dependent not on its ability
to solve specific problems already identified by one or another research tradition, but
on the possibility of expanding the scope of research problems beyond that of each
of the competing research traditions. Following Robert Cox (1981), we might say
that in contrast to theory that aims to solve problems posed within a given perspec-
itive, eclecticism is closer in spirit to critical theorizing in transcending existing analytic subdivisions and research parameters to construct a larger picture of the prevailing order and its origins. In that way our questions may come to resemble less closely stylized facts, a favorite of approaches dedicated to analytic parsimony, while resembling more the messiness of actual problems encountered by actors in the real world. Conceptual frameworks developed by competing research traditions are designed to problematize only select aspects of international life that are interconnected. Such analytic accentuation can be fruitful and is sometimes necessary in light of practical research constraints. It also poses specific risks. One is that assumptions deemed valuable for solving the kinds of problems favored by a given research tradition will be hoisted upon the analysis of other kinds of problems for which these assumptions may not be well suited. For example, neorealist explanations aiming to show that central aspects of EU politics are best captured by relative-gains calculations have failed to generate a distinctive research tradition dealing with the EU (Grieco 1990). Another risk is that explanatory sketches nested within research traditions may only pay attention to certain aspects of problems and to certain preselected variables, ignoring a wide range of factors that are potentially relevant to recognizing and solving a more comprehensively defined problem. The total silence of a voluminous literature on U.S. grand strategy on the topic of terrorism is, after September 11, a shocking intellectual failure explainable largely in terms of an overly narrow conception of security and security-relevant actors (Crenshaw 2002).

This plea for analytical eclecticism is predicated not on the rejection of research traditions or on the futility of the research products they generate, but on the hunch that there are significant intellectual gains to be had from reversing the trade-offs faced by scholars working in one or another research tradition. Following Robert Alford (1998:9), we do not seek to dissolve or reify the tensions between different traditions and sketches, but do believe that researchers who can theorize their problems within multiple traditions are in a better position to recognize previously hidden aspects of social reality. Since no one analytic perspective can confidently claim to offer all the insights we need, “the best case for progress in the understanding of social life lies in . . . the expanding fund of insights and understandings derived from a wide variety of theoretical inspirations” (Rule 1997: 18).

Eclecticism and Asian Security: The Shrinking of “Natural Expectations”

The relevance of different research traditions to different theoretical and empirical domains cannot conceal the fact that every research tradition generates its own unquestioned, that is “natural,” worldview. This worldview contains within it templates that draw investigators to certain problems at the expense of other, related ones, to specify a priori the most relevant variables in understanding these problems, and, in
the process, to identify some sources of behavior among actors while discounting others. Asian security offers ample illustrations for this proposition. The totally unanticipated end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union, for example, generated not reexamination of whether and why theories drawn from the major research traditions had proven inadequate. Instead, these events yielded another round of ad hoc explanations and bold predictions that essentially served to protect the natural worldviews embedded in each of the traditions. Getting trapped in unexamined premises is as easy for the adherents of all research traditions as it is for proponents of public policy. September 11 provides an illustration for how unexamined premises can generate striking simplifications as does the stark distinction between “good” and “evil” as a rhetorical map for U.S. foreign policy in a strikingly complex international reality. This binary distinction is based on a cascading of mutually reinforcing images and the causal effects they imply: peaceful relations with prosperous, efficient states that are friends of America contrast with warlike relations with poor, inefficient states that are America’s enemies. Explanatory sketches tend to be somewhat more subtle in the projection of worldviews, but the tendency toward undue simplification is still in evidence and is often debilitating to the endeavor of stating and resolving complex problems. Asian security is more complex than the unintended or deliberate cumulation of positive and negative images permits and than the natural expectations of any of the three research traditions accommodates.

For example, efforts to preserve and apply a realist worldview in the post–Cold War era initially led to overly pessimistic scenarios for Asia. Aaron Friedberg (1993/94: 7) thus argued that “in the long-run it is Asia (and not Europe) that seems far more likely to be the cockpit of great power conflict. The half millennium during which Europe was the world’s primary generator of war (and economic growth) is coming to a close. For better and for worse, Europe’s past could be Asia’s future.” We now know that the last decade has invalidated this prediction. To be sure, in the 1990s Asia had its share of military crises, and there remain numerous sources of lingering tensions that could easily lead to war. But it was Europe, not Asia, that was the scene of repeated episodes of ethnic cleansing and prolonged, bloody war. Our point is not that realist arguments must necessarily project pessimistic outcomes. Off-shore balancing (Mearsheimer 2001: 234–65) or nuclear deterrence (Goldstein 2001a) may exert stabilizing if not pacifying effects. The initial application of realist concepts to Asian security dilemmas and national security strategies required simplification for the sake of consistency with a realist worldview. And these simplifications missed important parts of the story that had relevance for real-world outcomes even if that part of the story could not be told well in the theoretical language of realism. Although some neoclassical realists have sought to recast inexorable laws as tendencies that can be modified by the policy choices of rival states, notably the United States (Rose 1988: 171–72), in the end, such adjustments do not overcome the fundamental problem. An exclusive focus on realism, whether structural or neoclassical, privileges a particular
set of problems and variables and arbitrarily precludes other lines of inquiry into potentially related domains.

Similarly unquestioned worldviews also mark liberal and constructivist styles of analysis. From a liberal perspective it seemed unquestionably true that Asia’s economic miracle would continue, spurred on by the low transaction costs associated with close business-government relations, bringing another generation of prosperity. Yet, the 1990s were the decade that showed Japan, Asia’s largest economy, sinking into a structural economic crisis that has generated the highest unemployment and lowest growth rates the country has seen since 1945. Another example of a mistaken liberal analysis is the IMF’s excessively optimistic assessment of the economic fortunes of Southeast Asia. A conference sponsored by the Bank of Indonesia and the IMF concluded in November 1996 that “ASEAN’s economic success remains alive and well. . . . The region is poised to extend its success into the twenty-first century” (International Monetary Fund 1996: 378). In an April 25, 1997 press conference, IMF managing director Camdessus remarked that the global economic outlook warranted “rational exuberance” (International Monetary Fund 1997a). And at the spring 1997 meeting, the Interim Committee of the Agreement committed itself to extend the IMF’s jurisdiction to cover the movement of capital, thus completing the “unwritten chapter” of Bretton Woods, according to Camdessus (International Monetary Fund 1997b: 129). The rest, as the saying goes, was history. The Asian financial crisis began rumbling in Thailand in June 1997 and by the end of November massive speculation had forced very serious economic dislocations in Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea and was soon to bring down the Suharto regime in Indonesia. In the following year, Brazil and Russia also fell as speculative attacks spread from Asia to the rest of the world. Now the contagion of liberal pessimism highlighted the disadvantages of the crony capitalism that marked the close relations between government and business, but also revealed the limitations of initial simplifications resulting from a liberal worldview.

Finally, constructivist analyses also make often far-reaching predictions based on unquestioned analytic premises. A theoretically innovative literature on ASEAN had extolled the emergence of a new collective identity in the early 1990s as ASEAN was moving toward an embryonic security community. ASEAN’s ineffective response to the Asian financial crisis has forced some reassessment (Acharya 2003, 2001, 1999c). So has the persistence of armed rebellion in Southeast Asia and the possible links of some of the resistance movements to global networks of terror (Katzenstein 2003; Tan 2000a; Collier 1999). Constructivist scholars with a more pessimistic bent run the risk of making the opposite mistake. Thomas Berger (2000), for example, worries considerably about the force of ancient hatreds in an Asia in which race remains an acknowledged political force. Yet, compared to the early 1990s, there is no new evidence in Asian political or security affairs that gives more credence to this dark view. In both cases, a tendency to a priori privilege a particular type of identity led to simplified projections about the implications of that identity for cooperation or conflict.
None of the limitations exhibited by the application of natural worldviews, largely informed by the history of the European state system, to Asian security are especially surprising. The extension of realist insights from Europe to Asia, for example, cannot help but be incomplete. In contrast to Europe, the history of the Asian state system was shaped for many centuries by the principle of suzerainty. Furthermore, located at the European periphery, most Asian states were deeply affected by a colonial experience that was simply absent in the relations among the imperialist powers in the European core. Similarly, the nature of Asian political economies differs from that of Europe. It makes little sense to extrapolate from the political experience of the early industrializers with liberal market economies in Europe to the late industrializers with developmental states in Asia. Relatedly, in Asia the most important effect of international institutions, some of the case studies in this book suggest, is to maintain ambiguity about collective purpose while creating a sense of commonality, rather than to promote transparency of objectives while enhancing efficiency. Finally, the forming of supranational collective identities in Asia is affected deeply by having acquired national sovereignty in the recent rather than distant past. And the nature of that collective identity may be affected substantially, in ways that contemporary theories of international relations have not yet begun to analyze, by the historical experiences and legacies of the Sinocentric world, which differ in many ways from the Greco-Roman world.

Natural expectations embedded in realist, liberal, and constructivist research traditions focus on the presumed likelihood of military conflict, economic prosperity, and variants of hyper- or supra-nationalism. Yet, in light of natural expectations that have remained unmet during the last decade, the complexities of Asian security invite further thought. This invitation extends not only to assessing questions of quantity, of more or less military conflict, economic growth, and collective identity. It also suggests that we inquire into the meanings of these concepts and the debates that surround them, that is, into the very factors that shape the world of beliefs and expectations that many of our explanatory sketches hope to comprehend. Far from applying a single logic ubiquitously or retreating to Orientalist or Occidentalist arguments about a supposedly unique “Asian” or “Western” way, stripping the political reality we seek to understand of its presumed “naturalness” is an important step to enabling intersubjective understanding. The analysis of discursive politics draws attention to the fact that, by definition, political reality is always contested and needs to be understood not only in general terms but also in relation to the specific political contexts in which it occurs and, as Weber reminds us, from the viewpoint of the actors involved. This requires a theoretical multilingualism predicated on the “denaturalization” of subjects and concepts as deployed in existing research traditions.

Thus, in the analysis of the security strategies of Asian states, an important task is to articulate a problematique that acknowledges the fluidity of the meanings attached to such terms as “Asia,” “state,” “strategy,” and “security.” Asia is not simply an objective geographic boundary that encompasses unambiguously several neighboring...
It is also an enduring set of social ties that have historically encompassed some set of actors and relationships but not others, allowing for cases of both trust and mistrust, enmity and amity. Regions do not exist only as material objects. Although they have a behavioral dimension indicated, for example, by the flow of goods and the travel of people across physical space, they cannot be represented simply and succinctly by accurate cartographic depictions. They are also constructs that are imagined and thus can bend to the efforts of political entrepreneurs. Southeast Asia, as a category of geographic space became a widely accepted term only in the 1940s and its persistence is closely associated with the history of the Cold War in that region. It remains to be seen whether this region will in a few decades acquire another designation such as “Maritime China” or “the extended Pacific Rim.” And the very term “Asia” has been open to many and varied attempts at political interpretation. The “Asian values” discussion, for example, had perhaps the greatest impact among U.S. academics and in U.S. policy circles although it was mainly a belated 1990s export from Singapore which deployed the concept in the 1970s as it sought to unite its ethnically divided population (Katzenstein 2000).

The origins and character of “states” in Asia should also not be taken as unproblematic. Asian states are marked by suzerainty as a long-standing institutional legacy (Oksenberg 2001). The system of tributary trade relations organized around a central power not always interested in intervening directly in the affairs of lesser powers does not have a clear functional equivalent in the conventional interpretations of the Westphalian state system. We do not understand well how that legacy affects the worldviews and behavior of Asia’s modern states. While most of Asia formally acceded to the Westphalian model of sovereignty that characterizes the globalization of the Western state system in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it would be very surprising indeed if such a legacy would have been superceded totally by the events of the recent past. We need to leave open the possibility that Asian states embrace somewhat different expectations about the boundaries that separate domestic from international affairs as well as about the motivations and behaviors of actors located in different spaces that connect both political domains.

Moreover, in understanding the “strategies” of states, it is important to appreciate that hegemony has material and nonmaterial components requiring that the hegemon’s power in its various dimensions be recognized by less powerful actors who are expected to acquiesce to the hegemonic order (Mastanduno 2003). Asian states, and in particular China and its neighbors, define their individual, institutional, and national interests, incorporating beliefs about appropriate forms of governance, with special attention to the relevance of the existing regional and social context (Alagappa 2001a: 63). For Asian security, Peter Van Ness (2002), David Kang (2003a, 2003b), and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama (2003) are all exploring the implications of a view that is predicated upon the assumption of hegemony as an important constitutive principle of international relations in Asia. This puts bandwagoning rather than balancing
at the center of the analysis of Asian states’ behavior. In their analyses they both draw on and undercut traditional theories of the balance of power, producing explanatory sketches that are not easily squared with the normal insights that any one of the major research traditions offers for our understanding of world politics.

Finally, compared to the notions shared widely among U.S. scholars and policy analysts, applied to Asia, the very idea of “security” needs to be understood in more comprehensive, historically contextualized terms, extending well beyond the military defense of territorial boundaries to encompass also a reasonable threshold of material welfare as well as collective understandings reflecting distinct ideational influences (Alagappa 1998a, 1998b). The latter encompass what Jennifer Mitzen (2002) refers to as “ontological security,” a robust sense of collective identity embedded in a wider set of meaningful social relations. The military dimension of social life that is so central to U.S. politics is not absent in Asia. Far from it, as smoldering conflicts on the Korean Peninsula, over Kashmir, and across the Taiwan Strait illustrate. But that dimension is embedded in the dramatic economic and social transformations that have reshaped much of Asia during the past half century and continue to do so today. In the understanding of many political actors it is that transformation and not Asia’s distribution of military capabilities that is the politically defining aspect of the security landscape.

In light of these considerations, the eclectic explorations featured in this volume begin with an open-ended understanding of the core subject: the “security” (broadly understood to encompass physical survival, material well-being, and existential security) “strategies” (reflecting different assumptions about actors’ motivations and the character of power relationships) of “states” (which differ in historical experience and thus character from those in Europe) in the “Asian region” (as defined by the actors’ own variable conceptions of the arena within which they have historically interacted with certain other actors). The “denaturalization” of the constructs that dominate perspectives on Asian security derived from existing research traditions is, however, only a first step. A second one is to open up possibilities for newly defined problems and causally significant interactions among variables normally privileged as part of distinct explanations embedded in competing traditions.

Before the mid-1990s, the theoretical discussion among scholars of international relations in the United States had concentrated almost exclusively on how to think about the relation between power and efficiency as realists dueled with neoliberals; only very recently has the crystallization of a constructivist research tradition prompted scholars of international relations to consider the intersection of issues of efficiency and identity or power and identity (Fearon and Wendt 2002; Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1999b). In Europe by way of contrast, liberal and constructivist scholars have been engaged in a long-standing theoretical debate about the relative significance of efficiency and identity, though sometimes at the expense of consideration of the continuing relevance of power. In the study of Asian international relations, an exclusive theoretical focus on either identity-driven state behavior, or regional institutions, or
the distribution of military capabilities simply does not capture the complex political and analytic sensibilities triggered by different contexts. The chapters in this volume illustrate the promise of combining the insights drawn from different explanatory sketches, seeking to understand the complex ways power, interests, and identities affect each other and combine to shape Asian states’ behaviors and relationships.

Thus, for some of the authors in this volume, “institutions” are not only significant for minimizing transaction costs and enhancing efficiency among cooperating actors with separate interests (as liberals would stress); they are also constructions that reflect shared identities or the distribution of power among some set of actors. Understood in this way, institutions produce shifts in actors’ interests and identities, and can, in turn, be transformed by changing configurations of interest and identity. For other authors, power and wealth matter significantly, not as omnipresent and fixed determinants of behavior but as something mediated, constrained, and distorted by institutional structures and as something that is given meaning to and understood by actors in their social settings. Understood in this way, “power” may be significant not only as a means to defend borders or force others to cooperate, but also as a basis for formulas for decision making within institutions or as a way of acquiring international prestige and diffusing “ontological security.” For those concerned with ideational factors, norms and identities are significant not as ever-fleeting structures of meanings, but as something that is appropriated and denied by power and as something whose influence is facilitated and embodied by institutions that constitute actors and regulate their behavior. Understood in this way, “identity” becomes almost a statement about an actor’s position relative to other actors, sometimes drawing attention to asymmetries of power, sometimes shaped by historical memories involving variable levels of institutionalized cooperation, and sometimes serving as a catalyst for cooperation or conflict. Were we to adhere strictly to any one of the three research traditions, these analytic possibilities would fall by the wayside or be viewed as epiphenomenal.

Preview of Case Studies

The case studies in this volume link constituent elements from at least two, and often all three, of the research traditions discussed above in both defining a problem related to Asian security and developing an original explanatory sketch. The sketches, albeit constructed independently, all aspire to provide important insights that are helpful in the description and explanation of the security strategies of Asian states or regional security arrangements, the “dependent variable” in each of the case studies that follow. The eclectic style of analysis in each of the case studies is evident in the multiple connections revealed among “independent variables,” alerting us to the existence of structures and processes that undercut the more stylized explanations privileged by any one research tradition. Put differently, the explanatory variables favored by each of the three established research traditions are partially recast in ways that
emphasize the linkages between these variables as these affect different dimensions of state or regional security.

The chapters in this book take a look at different empirical problems that all feed into the larger question of Asian security, understood broadly. Is China a revisionist or status quo power? Does Japan tip the scale toward bilateral security arrangements with the United States or multilateral ones with Asia? Why does the U.S.-Korea alliance persist in the face of a North Korean regime that, compared to South Korea, has become so much weaker since the 1960s? And how have the states of Southeast Asia sought to provide for their security in an era of strategic uncertainty? These questions are politically important and analytically intriguing. They are defined in a way that does not immanently privilege the kinds of problems and explanations favored by any one research tradition. And they provide researchers with ample opportunity for developing eclectic arguments that connect variables and processes from at least two of the three research traditions.

For example, as Iain Johnston’s careful empirical analysis demonstrates in Chapter 2, along many policy dimensions China has evolved into a status quo power. China’s development-based grand strategy is not directed against any one country but focuses instead on the development of internal power capabilities, for purposes of legitimacy and security. Marketization and a comprehensive security strategy thus go hand in hand in consolidating a fundamentally status quo orientation in policy. On the crucial issue of Taiwan, however, this internal focus has revisionist overtones, at least in the eyes of many American policy makers. It is, however, Taiwan’s democratization and Taiwanese nationalism that, together with Chinese capitalism and Chinese nationalism, are redefining the term “status quo.” The established political arrangement and the appropriate political discourse to describe those arrangements have since 1995 been challenged, not by the PRC but by Taiwan. And it has, at times, looked to Beijing like U.S. foreign policy was actively supporting or, at a minimum, condoning those changes instead of adhering firmly to its traditional One China policy. In the case of China, Taiwan, and the United States, with issues of identity and power tightly fused, who is the revisionist? Johnston’s analysis offers a fundamental challenge, both empirical and conceptual, to commonsensical notions grounded in a realist research tradition of which country in Asia is a status quo and which a revisionist power. Johnston’s analysis shows how limited revisionisms can amplify each other such that both sides believe the other is a major revisionist.

For several decades many observers have insisted that it was only natural for Japan to become once again a great military power, commensurate in its military capabilities with its economic and technological standing. Yet decade after decade Japanese policy has disconfirmed those expectations. More germane than the projection of fear instilled by the past and unquestioned expectations generated from a single research tradition, is an analysis of the mixture of bilateral and multilateral elements in Japan’s security policy. The conventional wisdom holds that a period of dangerous
ambivalence over Japan’s commitment to its security arrangements with the United States ended in the mid-1990s after the Japanese and U.S. governments reached a clear understanding of the conditions under which Japan would contribute actively in regional crises in Asia. Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara argue against that view in Chapter 3. The recalibration of bilateral and multilateral elements in Japanese policy serves not to reduce the ambiguities in its relations with the United States. Instead it reformulates that ambiguity in new terminology and expresses a long-standing Japanese objective, of wanting to belong both to the West and to Asia. The clarification of the Japanese obligations under the provisions of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty are much clearer in English than in Japanese. Unless the Japanese home islands are directly attacked, there is nothing in the new agreements that obliges the Japanese government to any specific course of action. A very specific terminology, deliberately chosen to accommodate the different political constraints operating in Washington and in Tokyo, leaves Japan’s obligations ill defined. Japanese security, U.S.-Japanese cooperation, and regional security are not necessarily undermined by ill-defined obligations; they may in fact be enhanced by them.

The persistence of the U.S.–South Korea alliance, J. J. Suh argues in Chapter 4, also presents an empirical anomaly not easily understood within any one of the three research traditions. How can we explain the disjuncture of the declining need for the alliance and its unquestioned acceptance, between alliance persistence in the face of a dramatic decline in North Korean capabilities, measured both in absolute and relative terms? The deterrent effect of the alliance may be one reason of course. But why did the South Korean government not push more actively for a minimum deterrence, Israeli style? And it overlooks important changes that have occurred on the ground over the last several decades. Suh argues that other factors may have been more important for the inattentiveness to various political signals that the North Korean government has sent at various times in possible attempts to improve relations with the South and the United States. High among these factors are the sunk costs in various institutional aspects of the alliance. Significant also are the collective identities the alliance has created over the last half century. To be sure, South Korea and the United States are not yet fully members of one democratic community. And they do not yet share fully in fundamental values. Identity does matter, however, in other and more subtle ways. Paradoxical though it may sound, the alliance derives much of its persistence from the need of the North Korean regime to maintain poor relations with its adversary to the south, so as to maintain its own internal coherence and sense of self; from the perceived political need of the South Korean government to attach itself unambiguously to the United States as the only conceivable protector against possible aggression from the North; and from the U.S. government’s identity as the protector of a small and vulnerable allied nation and now as the potential victim of the policies of an “evil” state that is suspected of making available to global networks of terrorists weapons of mass destruction.
Yuen Foong Khong’s analysis of ASEAN in Chapter 5 displays a different approach to combining research traditions. As is true of the U.S.-Korea alliance, ASEAN also shows the relevance of institutional analysis. Khong argues that ASEAN has created regional institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in order to reduce strategic uncertainty. Such institutions reduce strategic uncertainty by doing what liberal institutionalists say they do: providing information, lowering transaction costs, as well as frowning upon cheating. But Khong also suggests that power continues to matter: institutions like the ARF are also meant to anchor and enhance U.S. engagement in the region. The U.S. presence reassures Japan and reduces the prospect of a more far-reaching rearmament by Japan, while enhancing the prospect of a China that acts with restraint in Southeast Asia. Complementing this institutional strategy is what Khong describes as a soft-balancing strategy. Concerns about the possible withdrawal of the United States from Southeast Asia and the rise of China in the early 1990s led many of the major ASEAN states to offer the United States use of their naval facilities. Interestingly, this soft balance of power politics is couched in specific discursive conventions, such as the naming of U.S. preponderance as a constitutive feature of a regional balance of power. In sharp contrast to the importance of institutions and power, identity matters less. Nothing has replaced the ideological glue that a strong anti-Communist identity provided in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1980s and 1990s, neither the ascendance of Southeast Asia’s “economic tigers,” nor the growth of a Southeast Asian “security community,” nor “Asian values” have created politically equally compelling, alternative identities.

In their concluding Chapter 6, Allen Carlson and J. J. Suh underline once more that analytical eclecticism has the advantage of focusing on empirical anomalies. It helps problematize what any one research tradition may accept as “normal” or “natural.” Drawing on the various case studies, Carlson and Suh drive home the argument that underlies all of them: it is only by drawing selectively and judiciously on different analytic traditions that analysis can make sense of and account for Asian security affairs in their full complexity. Despite several lingering sources, Asian governments have managed to contain potentially explosive conflicts in the region through use of formal and informal institutions and with careful recourse to a politics of naming. The future of Asia’s security may hinge critically upon whether the United States as the lone superpower will remain sufficiently attuned to these features to maneuver its realpolitik in a way that does not disrupt the institutional and discursive underpinnings of Asia’s security orders.

In addressing a variety of different questions, the chapters in this book share one thing in common in the answers they offer. In how they frame their questions, or dependent variables, and in the way they develop their answers, or specify their independent variables, they all combine insights drawn from at least two of the research traditions. The chapters draw on a mixture of insights from the three different research traditions, pointing to the importance of, and relationships between, identity,
interest, and power in the adaptation of Asian states’ strategic behavior. This approach will probably raise uncomfortable questions among adherents of all three research traditions. It is also likely to yield new insights and spur further research into the interplay among the variables or processes typically privileged by each of the traditions.

Conclusion

A problem-focused eclecticism is not cost free. In international relations research as well as in the social sciences writ large, the flexibility required of eclectic approaches may be too great to permit the formation of collaborations capable of mobilizing strong attachments and enduring professional ties, crucial ingredients in often not very subtle struggles for intellectual and other forms of primacy in the world of scholarship. Furthermore, the theoretical multilingualism that the expanded scope of problems and explanatory sketches requires may tax an individual researcher’s stock of knowledge and array of skills while introducing also more “noise” into the established channels of communication, such as they are, within and across different research traditions. As a result, to those accustomed and committed to working within particular conceptual frameworks built on particular assumptions about social reality, the accommodation of eclectic perspectives may be dismissed as a waste of resources (Sanderson 1987) or merely undisciplined, “flabby” appeals for pluralism (Johnson 2002).

In light of the recurrent debates between, and inherent character of, research traditions, we are convinced that the advantages of eclecticism are well worth such costs. Without insisting that we have any prior knowledge of how best to construct different causal chains, we have gambled here on the intuition that analytical eclecticism can give us more purchase on interesting questions about Asian security than can analytic monism. The most significant advantage of eclecticism is that it facilitates intellectual exchanges that deepen and extend our understandings rather than producing the hard “truths” and “standards” of more parsimonious models addressing questions posed simply in the unidimensional space of only one research tradition. As Paul Diesing (1991: 364) notes, all explanations have to live with the fact that our truths will always be plural and contradictory. This does not mean that we need to give up the quest for explanation and it does not mean that all analytic or empirical problems need to be considered from multiple analytic perspectives. What it does mean is that any shared sense of progress in the study of international affairs depends on a common recognition of the convergences, complementarities, and differences across substantive claims arrived at within different research traditions; and that this, in turn, requires a degree of methodological pluralism and analytic multilingualism that is more characteristic of self-consciously eclectic modes of inquiry than of approaches embedded in a particular research tradition.

The analytical eclecticism we embrace proceeds from a view of social scientific research as a collective endeavor, an ongoing practice built on interdependent relation-
ships among individual researchers and research communities each with specific kinds of insights to offer in relation to particular questions cast at particular levels of generality (Sil 2000b). In this sense, analytical eclecticism has little in common with research traditions rigidly attached to core postulates, and more in common with calls for intellectual pluralism. Certainly, there are limits to how much integration can occur across approaches predicated on fundamentally incompatible foundational postulates and conceptual systems (Johnson 2002). Nevertheless, a principled refusal to “ontologize” analytic sketches offers something more disciplined paradigm-bound research cannot: it reinforces the dialogical character of international relations research and fights the tendency in scholarship to turn inward by preemptively establishing much stronger defenses of existing explanatory sketches than is warranted on intellectual grounds. For this reason, eclecticism is also principled in its opposition to the imposition of a uniform standard of scientific research practice, and, in line with current thinking among philosophers of science, it exploits the advantages and tolerates the disadvantages of inquiring into multiple truths at different levels of abstraction. Considering the diversity of approaches and the different ways of establishing what is true, as revealed in current debates in the philosophy of science, insistence on any one standard, including that there be no standard at all, undercuts the social nature of scientific conversation. If the unit of evaluation is regarded as the community of social scientists as a whole rather than the individual researcher (Laitin 1995: 456), then creating more space for eclectic approaches is virtually a necessary condition for whatever progress may be possible in social scientific research if for no other reason but that it reveals connections, convergences, or complementarities between substantive insights usually presented in different theoretical languages within different research traditions.

The adoption of an eclectic stance tends to go hand in hand with a pragmatic, “post-positivist” epistemology that is open to explore conceptual and empirical connections between approaches located at different points on an “epistemological spectrum” (Sil 2000c) spanning absolute formulations of positivism and relativism. Such a pragmatism is predicated on the refusal “to accept as hard and fast the classic oppositions between understanding and explanation, between history and science, between objective and subjective” (Alford 1998: 123). Specifically, an eclecticism predicated on pragmatism involves viewing the social world as at least partially socially constructed; recognizing the difficulties this poses for defining social facts and analyzing actors’ motivations; bracketing the investigator’s own subjective perceptions and normative commitments; and accepting the uncertainty accompanying the analysis of a socially constructed world without giving up on either the systematic collection and interpretation of data or the task of seeking to persuade skeptical communities of scholars. Such a perspective also calls for attention to “middle-range” explanatory sketches that split the difference between nomothetic and ideographic research, negotiating between the formalism of parsimonious models and elaborate exercises in hermeneutics or phenomenology and offering causal narratives that are
transportable to a limited number of contexts, without being so far abstracted from these contexts that the operationalization of concepts for each case is open to vigorous contestation (Sil 2000b). Research cast at such a level of abstraction will generate neither the most elegant models for investigating a problem nor the richest narrative about any one context, but it can enable simultaneous consideration of a wider range of analytic, interpretive, and observational statements drawn from varied social contexts and cast at different levels of abstraction.

In all these respects, eclectic modes of analysis contribute to what Thomas Fararo (1989) has referred to a "spirit of unification,” the diffuse intellectual state of mind required to enable consideration of combinatorial possibilities that have frequently produced unanticipated breakthroughs and common understandings of progress in the history of science. Viewed in this light, a key benefit of analytical eclecticism is not to subsume, replace, or unify explanatory sketches from different research traditions, but to foster scientific dialogue and enable communication between the different communities that produce these sketches. The skill of listening and talking knowledgeably in the languages of more than one research tradition, although requiring a large investment in time and effort and a predilection for intellectual versatility, generates an analytic multilingualism that can foster new concepts and unexpected synapses, open up new avenues for research for all research communities and last, but not least, improve the tone of the collective discussions among scholars of international relations in general and national security in particular. The discourse culture of “taking no prisoners,” so prominent not so long ago, may be on the wane. The sooner it disappears altogether the better for all of us. In the analysis of Asian security, and for the social sciences more generally, scientific dialogue is the best guarantee for progress, if progress is to be had, and the accommodation of analytical eclecticism offers the best hope for furthering scientific dialogue.

Notes


2. Challenging Popper’s gradualist theory of scientific progress as continuous and cumulative, Kuhn (1962) interpreted the history of science as a sequence of periods of normal science interspersed by shorter episodes of revolutionary science. Normal science is marked by the ascendance of a single paradigm that determines the central research questions, specifies the range of acceptable methods in approaching them, and provides criteria for assessing how well
they have been answered. Revolutionary science occurs in those brief interludes when scientific communities, frustrated by increasing numbers of anomalies, begin to focus on new problems and take up new approaches that can address these anomalies. Once a new cluster of questions, assumptions, and approaches has acquired large numbers of supporters, this may pave the way for the emergence of a new and once again dominant paradigm. Significantly, paradigms are assumed to be incommensurable, with the standards and methods employed by supporters of one paradigm judged unacceptable by supporters of another.

3. Responding to Kuhn’s rejection of objective markers of continuous progress, Lakatos (1970) introduced the concept of “research program.” Thus he captured more pluralistic scientific communities and left open the possibility for some limited comparisons of theories generated by competing research programs. For Lakatos, scholarship is marked by multiple research programs, some in “progressive” phases, others in “degenerative” phases, depending on whether they are still capable of producing new theories that could explain new phenomena or surpass the explanatory power of past theories. At the same time, Lakatosian research programs have a number of features—a “hard core,” a “protective belt” of auxiliary assumptions, and positive and negative “heuristics”—that essentially perform the same functions as Kuhn’s paradigms.

4. See Walker (2003) for a more elaborate argument about why Laudan’s understanding of research traditions is more useful than Lakatos’s treatment of research programs for characterizing international relations scholarship and encouraging more cooperation than rivalry among proponents of different intellectual schools.

5. This strategy for negotiating the nomothetic-ideographic divide should be distinguished from the sort of integration attempted by proponents of “analytic narratives” (Bates et al. 1998). Analytic narratives proceed from a realist, not pragmatist, philosophy of science, and the principles of explanation in each narrative are ultimately embedded in a highly abstract model of strategic rationality the core logic of which remains unresponsive to the “thick” narrative. The latter are constructed as interpretations that essentially reflect this logic but without reference to competing strands of historiography and without any possibility for generating alternative theoretical logics (Sil 2000a). A pragmatist approach to “middle-range” theorizing, by contrast, points to more modest generalizations within specified domains of inquiry, with a more dialectical understanding of the relationship between theoretical constructs and empirical interpretations.

6. Fararo (1989: 175–76) views “unification” as a series of recursive integrative episodes rather than the construction of a single theory supported by a heroic individual or a crusading group of researchers seeking to subsume everybody and everything. For example, Darwinian principles of natural selection first became integrated with the Mendelian hypothesis of inheritance through discrete genes, before a second integrative episode enabled this synthesis to incorporate principles of molecular biology. Both episodes required a diffuse state of mind that was open to consideration of facts and hypotheses from previously separate research traditions. It is this diffuse state of mind that Fararo refers to as the “spirit of unification.”